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SMOKE, MIRRORS, AND THE JOKER IN THE PACK
With smoke and mirrors the entertainer-magician creates
images that thrill, delight, or confound the audience.'
In Armenia, the smoke and mirrors of shining words and the
strategic adoption of progressive legislation hide the reality of
stagnant democratization and rule of law reform that reflects a
creeping authoritarianism2  exemplified by the Russian
Federation.3
In the deck of cards, the joker is the wild card-the
unpredictable element that may trump all the other cards, and
put the other players off balance-throwing, and perhaps
winning, the game.4
Appearing and disappearing among the smoke and mirrors
that project the image of Armenian democracy and rule of law
reform is the joker which, to date, has blocked Armenia's
transition.
The joker's identity is unknown and perhaps unknowable. Is
it a cadre of power holders? Is it the hidden power behind the
1998 parliamentary assassinations? Or is it the psychological
mindset of powerlessness and alienation,5 bureaucratic paralysis
1. Academics in the field of anthropology have studied the role of mirrors. For
example, anthropologist Victor Turner has described "magical mirrors of social reality
[that] exaggerate, invert, re-form, magnify, minimize, dis-color, re-color, even
deliberately falsify.., events." VICTOR TURNER, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF PERFORMANCE
42 (1986) (discussing genres of cultural performance). Worthy of further study, but left
unexplored in this Article, is the subject of elections as cultural performance.
2. The creeping authoritarianism in Armenia seems to mirror a phenomenon that
Western observers fear is already taking place in Russia. See Editorial, A Message for
Mr. Putin, WALL ST. J., Sep. 26, 2003, at A8; see also Steven Lee Myers, Russia Pushing
Measure to Curb Private Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2005, at Al (discussing Russia's
"control over charities and other private organizations"); Joel Brinkley, Pro-Democracy
Groups Are Harassed in Central Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at A3 (describing
restrictions on the activities of pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in
Russia and Central Asia).
3. Throughout the Article, the state successor to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (U.S.S.R. or Soviet Union) is referred to interchangeably as the Russian
Federation and Russia.
4. "'Joker' is a name given to an odd card added to the pack .... This 53rd card,
when admitted to the pack, counts as a trump. In 'poker' and other games 'The Joker' is
the highest trump of all." W. GURNEY BENHAM, PLAYING CARDS: HISTORY OF THE PACK
AND EXPLANATIONS OF ITS MANY SECRETS 157 (1957).
5. On the way to a meeting in Yerevan, Armenia's capital city, I observed water
shooting up from the sidewalk in an area of Yerevan that was subject to scheduled water
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and corruption lingering from the Soviet era? Is the joker the
dominance of the Executive Branch enshrined in the post-Soviet
Constitution, with its accompanying abasement of the Judiciary
and Legislature? What of the intersection of the hopes and
dreams of the Armenian Diaspora and the political power of its
lobby with the reluctance of the Armenian power structure to
concede power to the people?
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Transitioning From "Them" to "Us"
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) officially
dissolved in 1991, and its component republics were set free to
make their own sovereign way in the world. 6 These are called
transitional countries. 7  The depth and breadth of the
contemplated transition is breathtaking in its scope.8
lockoffs. It was clearly caused by a broken water pipe. The water had been spewing out
for several days. "Why," I asked the ABA/CEELI Armenian driver, "has this not been
fixed? Do you think anyone has called? All this water is going to waste when the pipes
often are shut down." "No one will call," he replied. "If someone calls, they will take a
name, and everyone will know that this is a person who calls."
6. See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS:
A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 146 (2d ed. 2006); End of the Soviet Union: Gorbachev's
Six Tumultuous Years at Soviet Helm, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1991, § 1, 13.
7. The appellation "transitional" derives from a Western, nonintrospective stance.
The underlying assumption of the West that the more-than-decade-long transition will
end in a mirror image of the West reveals a failure to perceive the West's own ongoing
evolution. That evolution is epitomized in the United States, for example, by the
emergence of a monarchical presidency. George F. Will, Op-Ed., No Checks, Many
Imbalances, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2006, at A27; Editorial, Mr. Cheney's Imperial
Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A26 (both opinion pieces describe the efforts of
the administration of President George W. Bush to expand the scope of power of the U.S.
Presidency-to the perceived detriment of the rule of law and the checks and balances of
the U.S. constitutional system). The transitional countries are the Russian Federation
and the former Soviet Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia,
Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan, together with the former satellite states such as Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia. See, e.g., Shlomo Avineri, On Problems of Transition in Postcommunist
Societies, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1921, 1925 (1998).
8. See Avineri, supra note 7, at 1934 ("The collapse of communism was not merely
the collapse of a political or economic system, nor was it merely the demise of a
particularly repressive form of tyranny. It was a total collapse of a whole way of life, a
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"Transitional" describes a movement: from communism to
capitalism and democracy; from command and control economies
and dependence to the free market and independence; from
repression and acceptance to freedom and questioning; from
constituent part to autonomous whole; and from represented to
representing.9
In other words, transitioning from "them" to "us"10 -to the
mirror image of the idealization of Western capitalist
democracies. After all, capitalism, democracy, and the West, had
won the epic, decades-long battle of the Cold War.11
The complexities and challenges of the process of transition
for the former Soviet Republics, now more than a decade and a
half long, is evident in the disparate nature of their current
circumstances. While Poland, the Baltic Republics (Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia), and the component parts of the former
Czechoslovakia (the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary and
Slovenia (formerly a constitutive republic of Yugoslavia) are now
members of the European Union, others continue to struggle
with the challenges of the post-Soviet reality.' 2  Ethnic
Lebenswelt .... Never have so many people lost so many of their social and psychological
anchors in such a short time ... ").
9. Also, in the case of Armenia, for example, from melting pot to ethnic purity. See
id. at 1924-26 (describing the rise in and expressions of ethnic nationalism in Armenia,
Georgia, Azerbaijan).
10. The use of the pronoun "us" attempts to convey the mindset of a significant
number of political and opinion leaders as well as public opinion in the West-the classic
"insider" versus "outsider" viewpoint that distinguishes self and community from "the
other." It does not necessarily reflect the Author's viewpoint, except in as much as the
Author may be deemed a product, through citizenship, education, and other affiliations
and influences, of the West.
11. See Avineri, supra note 7, at 1924 ('The conventional wisdom after the fall of
the Berlin Wall was that the demise of communism would herald, almost automatically
and universally, the emergence and secure institutionalization of democracy and market
economy."); see also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 42
(1992) ("As mankind approaches the end of the millennium, the twin crises of
authoritarianism and socialist central planning have left only one competitor standing in
the ring as an ideology of potentially universal validity: liberal democracy . .
Fukuyama also opined that "[d]espite the bad moral odor that capitalism has had... [,]
its ultimate victory as the world's only viable economic system is easier to explain...
than is the victory of liberal democracy in the political sphere." Id. at 90-91.
12. Europa, Member States, http://europa.eu/abe/european-countries/eu_members/
indexen.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
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conflicts-which led, for example, to the breakup of the former
Yugoslavia, low standards of living, and difficulties-both
economic and social-of adjusting to free market economic
systems have created stumbling blocks for many of the new
states. 13 Further, the installation of authoritarian regimes in
Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan, has stymied the republics'
movements toward democracy. 14 Even the republics that have
overcome post-Soviet political malaise or repression, or both,
through a successful expression of "people power" (namely the
Orange Revolution of Ukraine, the Rose Revolution of Georgia,
and Kygyrstan's ejection of its former President) have
encountered difficulties in the execution of pro-Western,
popularly backed reform. 15
B. Armenia's Transition to Democracy
This Article assesses, through the lenses of elections and
Armenia's Constitution, the transition to democracy and the
rule of law in the former Soviet Republic of Armenia (Armenia
or the Republic). Armenia, which has encountered many of the
challenges faced by the other transitional countries, and might
appear to be similarly, if not better, circumstanced, provides an
excellent case study, particularly in view of the advantages that
the Republic appeared to have when it became an independent
member of the international community.
Through exploration of multiple layers of meaning in the
analogy of smoke, mirrors, and the joker in the pack, it is
possible to recognize certain broad themes in the process of
transition in Armenia-themes which have general applicability
to other transitional societies. To challengers who may claim
"There is no joker" and "All transitions, whether from
communism to democracy or from feudalism to fettered
13. Grzegorz W. Kolodko, Ten Years of Post-Socialist Transition: Lessons for Policy
Reforms 2, 13 (The World Bank Development Economics Research Group, Working
Paper No. 2095, 1999).
14. See, e.g., Press Release, Freedom House, Challenges and Opportunities for
Democracy in Former Soviet Countries (June 15, 2005), available at http://www.freedom
house.orgltemplate.cfm?page=70&release=278.
15. See, e.g., Marc Champion, In Russia's Shadow, Georgia's Leader Remakes
Nation, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2006, at Al.
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monarchy entail upheaval, are imperfect, and do not flow
smoothly," I interpose the following rebuttal: To the extent that
no transition is easy or free of challenges, it is more crucially the
task of the analyst to identify the factors that pose barriers to
such transitions. Only through identification, subjection to
analysis, comparison, and contrast of individual factual
circumstances can the jokers be managed, constrained, and
neutralized.
The assessment performed in this Article neither implies
nor adopts a particular incarnation of democracy. However, a
normative bias in favor of democracy does underlie the analysis.
In 1992, Professor Thomas Franck wrote of the emergence of a
new international norm-the right to democratic governance. 16
Tracing the emergence of the norm through both state practice
and its foundation in the right to self-determination, among
other rights,17 Franck identifies "[tihe ... newest building block
in constructing the entitlement to democracy ... the emerging
normative requirement of a participatory electoral process."' 8 In
a later work, Franck acknowledged the complexities inherent in
a global movement toward democracy. 19 In clarifying his claim,
he made clear that the democracy that is protected by the new
norm is "not some unattainable, impracticable absolute
democracy";20 instead, the content of the emergent right is the
creation of "a presumption in favor of governance by the free,
equal, and secret expression of popular will."' 2 1
Similarly, the analysis conducted in this Article does not
attempt to measure Armenia's transition to democracy (or its
adherence to the rule of law) against some extant manifestation
16. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46, 47 (1992) [hereinafter Franck, The Emerging Right] ('This newly emerging
'law'-which requires democracy to validate governance-[is] also becoming a
requirement of international law, applicable to all and implemented through global
standards ... ").
17. See id. at 52-74 (discussing the right to self determination and personal
expression, and state practice with respect to elections).
18. Id. at 63.
19. See Thomas M. Franck, The Democratic Entitlement, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 1-2
(1994) [hereinafter Franck, Democratic Entitlement].
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id. at 5.
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of democracy, the rule of law, or even a particular idealized
conception of those terms. Clearly, even if one looks to more
mature democracies, such as the United States, serious
questions could be raised not only about the electoral processes 22
but also structural features of the U.S. constitutional
framework. 23 Instead, this Article attempts to ascertain, with
respect to Armenia's transition to democracy, whether the
Armenian people govern through the "free, equal, and secret
expression of popular will. ' '24
Since September 1991, when the Republic declared its
independence from the Soviet Union,25 the country has often
been held up as a beacon of democracy 26 and economic freedom 27
among transitional countries. The country appeared to be poised
22. Consider, for example, the debacles of the U.S. presidential elections of 2000.
23. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION? (2001) (asking whether there are democratic defects in the American
Constitution).
24. See Franck, The Democratic Entitlement, supra note 19, at 5.
25. GEORGE A. BOURNOUTIAN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN PEOPLE 332
(2d ed. 2003).
26. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Assistance to
Armenia-Fiscal Year 2004 (Aug. 17, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/p/eurl
rls/fs/35976.htm ("Armenia has been one of the leading performers in Eurasia in
economic and political reform .. "); see also Elizabeth F. Defeis, Armenian
Constitutional Referendum: Towards a Democratic Process, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
269, 269 (1995) [hereinafter Defeis, Armenian Constitutional Referendum].
Paradoxically, as early as 1999, Thomas Carothers included Armenia in a list of
countries that had made initial steps toward democracy but had regressed to "strongman
rule" or other forms of authoritarianism. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY
ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 108-09 (1999) (diagnosing a backward shift into "semi-
authoritarianism of one kind or another" by Armenia and other countries).
27. See, e.g., Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Op-Ed., Wish They All Could Be Like
Estonia, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2006, at A10 (reproducing the rankings chart of the 2006
Index of Economic Freedom published by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage
Foundation that ranks Armenia twenty-seventh, third highest among the countries of
the former Soviet bloc-only Estonia and the Czech Republic ranked higher, at seventh
and twenty-first respectively). Economic indicators show that Armenia's economic
transition is proceeding well. Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, Armenia-IMF
Mission Concluding Statement (Feb. 20, 2004), available at http://www.imf.orgl
externalnp/ms/2004/022004.htm (' The Armenian economy continued to display high
economic growth in 2003, expanding by nearly 14% .... The business environment has
also improved, contributing to an increase in investment.").
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for success, with a well-educated population 28 and ardent
support from the Armenian Diaspora,29 which had attained
much lobbying power in Western countries such as the United
States. 30 Although a superficial examination would indicate,
based on the adoption of new laws, 3 1 the amendment of much
Soviet-era legislation,32 the ratification of international human
rights treaties, 33  among other overt actions such as
memberships in the World Trade Organization 34 and the
28. See SHALE HOROWITZ, FROM ETHNIC CONFLICT TO STILLBORN REFORM: THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION AND YUGOSLAVIA 86 (2005).
29. Id. Ethnic Armenians are citizens of varied countries throughout the world-
the result of different emigration movements throughout history. GERARD J. LIBARIDIAN,
MODERN ARMENIA: PEOPLE, NATION, STATE 35-36 (2004). Modern Armenian
communities exist in, for example, France, Lebanon, Russia, the United States, Cyprus,
and Greece. Id. at 36, 248, 298. The Russian, French and U.S. communities are said to be
the "largest and wealthiest" of the Diaspora communities. Id. at 298. See BOURNOUTIAN,
supra note 25, at 332-58 (discussing the nature and histories of the various Diaspora
communities).
30. See discussion of the Armenian Diaspora's power in the United States
infra Part VI.B. 1.
31. For example, legislation creating the position of Ombudsman was approved by
the Armenian General Assembly on October 21, 2003. Liz Fuller, Armenia Introduces
Post of Ombudsman, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Oct. 22, 2003,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/101221003.asp?po=y; Kristina Gevorkyan, The
Ombudsman/Human Rights Defender, ARM. L. REV. (July 17, 2006), http://www.arm
lawreview.org/archive/ombudsman.htm (discussing the legislation, including its purpose,
responsibilities of the ombudsman, and mechanism for appointment).
32. Armenia's new criminal code, adopted in April 2003, abolished the death
penalty, among other changes. See ANNA WALKER, NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2004: ARMENIA
17 (Freedom House, 2004), available at http://unpanl.un.org/intradoclgroups/public/
documents/NISPAceeUNPAN016569.pdf.
33. Upon its accession to the Council of Europe on January 25, 2001, Armenia
signed, and has since ratified, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and ten of its protocols. Council of Europe
Information Office, Countries Info: Armenia and the Council of Europe,
http://www.coe.int/T/E/ComlAboutCoelMember_-States/e-ar.asp (last visited Apr. 1,
2007). In addition, Armenia has since signed and ratified Council of Europe treaties
addressing, for example, the prohibition of torture and cruel and inhuman treatment and
the protection of minorities. Council of Europe, Armenia, Jan. 29, 2007,
http://conventions.coe.intlTreaty/CommunlListeTraites.asp?PO=ARM&MA=999&SI=2&
DF=&CM=3&CL=ENG.
34. Armenia became a member of the World Trade Organization on February 5,
2003. World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, Jan. 11, 2007,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto.e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
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Council of Europe, 35 that the Republic of Armenia is in the
midst of a grand transition toward democracy and rule of law
reform, this is, in a fundamental sense, but an illusion.
Analysis of post-Soviet elections and plebiscites in Armenia,
the balance of power among the branches of government
enshrined in Armenia's 1995 Constitution, and both the process
of amendment and the substance of the amended Constitution
adopted through a referendum in December 2005 indicate that
the country is in the throes of a creeping authoritarianism, a
pseudo democracy with a de facto autocrat at its helm.36 Despite
the apparent wide-ranging changes in the legal and political
landscape since 1991, rule of law reform and the spread of
democracy is largely superficial and formalistic. 37 The people of
Armenia are experiencing a simulacrum of democracy that has
dashed their hopes and expectations of post-Soviet
transformation.
Part II of this Article summarizes Armenia's recent
economic, social, and political history. Part III summarizes and
analyzes trends in the conduct of Armenia's post-Soviet
elections, describing the events surrounding elections, including
alleged and documented violations and the popular
demonstrations against the results. Part IV employs narrative
devices to give the flavor of the Armenian presidential elections
of 2003, of which the author was an observer. Part V examines
Armenia's Constitution, centering on the status of the Judiciary
and the process and looked-for benefits of the Constitution's
2005 amendment as a mechanism to evaluate adherence to the
rule of law. Part VI attempts to identify the "joker in the pack,"
35. The Council of Europe was formed in 1949 as part of a wave of European
integration attempts following World War II. See George A. Berman et al., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION Law 4 (2d ed. 2002). The organization has forty-six
member states, many of which are also members of the European Union. Council of
Europe, The Council of Europe's Member States (June 2006), http://www.coe.int/
T/E/Com1AboutCoefMemberStates/.
36. Other phenomena, identification and analysis of which point toward the
dysfunction in the political and social system, are the rise of the mafia, widespread
bureaucratic corruption, and increasing disparity in income and inadequacy of the social
safety net. For further discussion, see infra Part VI.
37. That is half-heartedly de jure, but certainly not de facto. See infra Part V.
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while Part VII concludes by assaying the steps required for
transition to democracy and adherence to the rule of law in
Armenia.
II. ARMENIA AFTER THE U.S.S.R.
A strategically important country 38  with which most
Americans are unfamiliar, for a period of time after dissolution
of the Soviet Union, Armenia reportedly received the second
largest amount of annual aid from the United States on a per
capita basis, only behind Israel.39 Since 1993, the Republic has
received grants and loans from international monetary and
lending institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund,
totaling more than $1 billion (USD). 40 In addition, since 1992,
the United States alone directed more than $1.6 billion (USD) in
aid to Armenia.41 Although the relationship with the United
States is a close one and Diaspora Armenians defend Armenia's
38. For the West, reliable access to the mineral wealth of Azerbaijan and the
Caspian Sea require that the ethnic conflicts in the region should not simmer to boiling
point. In addition, Armenia's location on the periphery of the Middle East creates an
incentive for the United States to facilitate peace in the region. Should hostilities erupt
once more between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the conflict might spread to Iran, Armenia's
neighbor to the South. For Russia, Armenia is the southern edge of its sphere of
influence in the Caucasus, a buffer zone between it and the Turks and Persians to the
south. For Iran, Armenia serves to separate the ethnic Azeri population of its northern
reaches from their brothers in Azerbaijan. Afshin Molavi, Iran's Azeri Question: What
Does Iran's Largest Ethnic Minority Want?, EURASIANET.ORG, Apr. 15, 2003,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/culture/articles/eav041503.shtml (discussing,
among other things, the potential of unification of Iran's ethnic Azeris with Azerbaijan).
Ethnic Azeris make up 24% of Iran's total population. CIA, The World Factbook: Iran,
Mar. 15, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbooklgeos/ir.html; For a fuller
discussion of Armenia's strategic importance, see LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 283-302.
39. Mark McDonald, 16 Years After Armenia Quake, Aid Still Flows In; Missions
Remained After Media Left - Groups Worry About Creating Dependence, SEATTLE TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2005, at A16 ('Today, Armenia is one of the largest per-capita recipients of U.S.
government aid in the world, reportedly second only to Israel. A large and influential
immigrant population in the United States helps drive those government
appropriations."); see also Defeis, Armenian Constitutional Referendum, supra note 26,
at 269 n,.
40. U.S. & FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERV. AND U.S. STATE DEP'T, DOING BUSINESS IN
ARMENIA: A COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FOR U.S. COMPANIES 2 (2004), available at
http://yerevan.usembassy.gov/commerce/ccg.pdf.
41. Id. at 3.
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interests in the United States,42 Armenia also maintains close
ties with Russia 43 and Iran 44-strategic alignments that provide
a buffer from the hostility of its Turkish and Azeri neighbors. 45
A. Geography and History of Armenia
Landlocked in mountainous territory between the Caspian
and Black Sea, today's Armenia is a mere fragment of the
Armenian people's historic territory, which once stretched from
eastern Turkey through the Transcaucasus. 46 A region of
contested dominance among the Persian, Ottoman, and Tsarist
Russian empires, 47 the territory that is now Armenia was
conquered and annexed into the Russian Empire in 1828.48 A
brief independence from the Russians, lasting from 1918 until
1921, was followed by absorption into the Soviet Union. 49 It was
after the conquest by communist Russia that the current borders
between Armenia and Azerbaijan were delineated in their
current configuration, 50 laying the groundwork for the current
conflict with Azerbaijan.
42 In the winter of 2002, Armenia was included on the list of countries whose
nationals residing in the United States were required to register with the Immigration &
Naturalization Service. Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens From Designated
Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 77135, 77136 (Dec. 16, 2002). Following one weekend's
extraordinary lobbying by the Armenian Diaspora in the U.S., including blitzing the
White House with outraged faxes, Armenia was removed from the list. Press Release,
Armenian National Committee of America, Bush Administration Revises I.N.S. Policy
On Requiring Registration of Armenian Nationals in the United States, Dec. 16, 2002,
http://www.anca.org/press-releases/pressreleases.php?prid=274; see also discussion
infra Part VI.B.1.
43. In 2002-2003, the Armenian government sold to Russian business interests
industrial infrastructure remaining from the Soviet era, and the Chernobyl-style nuclear
facility at Medzamor. LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 289-90.
44. Id. at 243-44.
45. Id. at 244.
46. See BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, Maps 21-23. Armenia lies between the Black
Sea and the Caspian Sea, surrounded by Georgia to the north, Azerbaijan to the
northeast and south (Nackichevan), Iran to the south, and Turkey to the south and east.
A map depicting Armenia and its neighbors can be found in the Appendix.
47. Id. at 211-15.
48. Id. at 215.
49. Id. at 297-313.
50. See id. at 312 (recounting the negotiated settlements reached by Russia and
Turkey regarding the disposition of territory, made with no input from the Armenians).
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B. Post-Soviet Political Developments; Conflicts & Consequences
Armenia remained a Soviet Republic until 1991, when the
Republic declared its independence based on a plebiscite, during
which citizens of Soviet Armenia voted overwhelmingly in favor
of independence from the Soviet Union.51 Since gaining its
independence, the people of this tiny52 Transcaucasian republic
have engaged in fierce conflict with their neighbor, Azerbaijan. 53
As a consequence, Armenia has also continued to endure a
closed border and economic blockade54 by Azerbaijan, as well as
Turkey, its large neighbor to the west. It has also experienced
the traumatic assassination of Members of its Parliament
broadcast live on public television.55
In 1988, the Supreme Soviet of Nagorno-Karabagh, the
majority Armenian Autonomous Region within Azerbaijan's
borders, 56 delivered a request to Moscow that the region be
transferred from Azerbaijan's to Armenia's control. 57 The
request was met with strong public reactions in both countries-
an outpouring of large public demonstrations in Armenia in
support of the request 58  and anti-Armenian pogroms in
51. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 210; BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at 332.
The declaration of independence and the popular referendum that approved it took place
a few months before the formal collapse of the Soviet empire. BOURNOUTIAN, supra note
25, at 332, 356.
52. Armenia is slightly smaller than Maryland, with an area of 29,800 square
kilometers. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Armenia, https://www.cia.
gov/cialpublications/factbooklgeos/am.html [hereinafter CIA Factbook: Armenia] (last
visited Apr. 1, 2007).
53. See, e.g., Susan Sachs, Armenia's Isolation Grows Only Deeper, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 2004, Al.
54. Id.
55. On October 27, 1999, five gunmen entered the Armenian Parliamentary
Assembly, killing the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the House, and six other officials.
See Emil Danielyan, Armenia: Parliament Massacre Still a Mystery Three Years Later,
RADIO FREE EUR./RADIo LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Oct. 28, 2002, http://www.rferl.org/features/
2002/10/28102002161752.asp; see discussion infra Part I.C.
56. See HOROWITZ, supra note 28, at 77. Armenians constituted approximately 75%
of Karabagh's population at that time. Id. The names "Nagorno-Karabagh" or "Nagorno-
Karabakh" and "Karabagh" or "Karabakh" are used interchangeably throughout the
Article. Both spellings are encountered in the relevant literature.
57. Id.
58. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 206.
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Azerbaijan. 59 Tension and allegations of mistreatment and
massacre escalated on both sides, leading to the outbreak of
hostilities. The situation deteriorated with more
demonstrations, pogroms, exchanges of population and military
conflict. 60 Armenia's Azeris fled the Republic and Azerbaijan's
Armenians fled Azerbaijan. 61 The U.S.S.R., unable to contain
the conflict, and further preoccupied by its own woes, switched
support from Azerbaijan to Armenia62  on the basis of
geopolitical imperatives 63 and as its own leadership changed. 64
The conflict increased following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, and continued until 1994, when a ceasefire was brokered
under the auspices of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Minsk Group. 65 The conflict left
Armenia cleansed of its Soviet-era Azeri population 66 and
holding one-fifth of Azerbaijan's internationally recognized
59. See id. at 207.
60. See id. at 206-08; BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at 327-32; HOROWITZ, supra
note 28, at 77-81. Armenian nationalists "liberated" the Nagorno-Karabagh region.
Thomas Cromwell, Nagorno-Karabakh: 'There is no going back for us,'
http://diplomatictraffic.com/highlightsarchives.asp?ID=163 (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
The region is now a self-declared independent republic whose legitimacy is recognized
only by Armenia. Id.
61. HOROWITZ, supra note 28, at 77; LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 235;
BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at 330.
62. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 208; BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at
331-32, 368-72.
63. The Soviet Union was in the throes of collapse, as the independence dreams
unmasked by Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika divided the energies of Russia and
the Soviet Union's constituent republics. BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at 369-71
(discussing the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and Armenia's recognition as a
sovereign state).
64. Id. at 370-71 (citing Gorbachev's resignation as president).
65. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the world's
largest regional security organization; it provides a forum for member state political
negotiations and conflict resolution and avoidance, among other functions. See OSCE,
About, http://www.osce.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2007). The Minsk Group (so called
based on the site of an international conference on the Nagorno-Karabagh issue in
Minsk, Belarus) was constituted following Armenia's and Azerbaijan's agreement to
mediation of the conflict by the OSCE. LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 234.
66. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 235 (describing the movement of ethnic
Armenians out of Azerbaijan and ethnic Azeris out of Armenia).
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territory,67 including the Lachin corridor between Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabagh. 68
During and subsequent to the conflict, Armenia endured a
blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey which interrupted its
communications, transport, and energy supply links with Russia
and the wider world. 69 Armenia also suffered a devastating
earthquake in 1988 that killed 25,000 people. 70 The energy crisis
that began with the 1989 imposition of the blockade71 .
contributed to a ruinous shrinkage of its economy, epitomized by
a 60% decrease in GDP between 1991 and 1993.72 The energy
crisis ended only with the reopening of the Medzamor nuclear
plant in 1995.7 3
C. Political Leaders and Assassins
Armenia's leadership is inextricably linked with the
Nagorno-Karabagh conflict; it was from the group of leaders who
supported Karabagh's bid to rejoin Armenia (the Karabagh
67. CIA Factbook: Armenia, supra note 52. One consequence of the war has been
the homogenization of Armenia. Once a multi-ethnic and diverse region of the world,
located at the crossroads of three great empires (Persian, Russian, and Ottoman),
Armenia is now, arguably, one of the least ethnically diverse countries in the world. The
population is 97.9% Armenian, 1.3% Yezidi Kurd, 0.5% Russian, and 0.3% other. Id. at 4.
Moslem Kurds not directly involved in the conflict also departed Armenia for Azerbaijan.
See, e.g., ANNA MATEVA, THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: NATIONALISM, CONFLICT AND
MINORITIES 18 (Minority Rights Group Int'l 2002). In neither country are the refugees of
that conflict fully integrated into the social and political lives of the nations. For
example, in Armenia, refugees are allowed to vote in local elections, but are prohibited
from participation in presidential and parliamentary elections. See ELECTORAL CODE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF ARM., art. 2.
68. ROBERT KAPLAN, EASTWARD TO TARTARY 325 (2001).
69. BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at 332, 339, 372; LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at
226. The blockade continued following the ceasefire and exists to this day. See Sachs,
supra note 53, at Al. Armenia's only open borders are with Georgia and Iran. See id.
70. LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 207.
71. BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at 369.
72. HOROWITZ, supra note 28, at 81; see LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 224-31
(summarizing the economic challenges confronting the new republic).
73. See BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at 374. The plant had been closed toward the
end of the Soviet era in response to the populace's protest against the environmental
dangers. LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 369.
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Committee) that the nation's post-Soviet leadership arose. 74
Levon Ter-Petrossian, Armenia's first post-Soviet president who
served from 1991 to 1998, as well as key figures in his
government, led the Karabagh Committee as it transformed into
the Armenian National Movement, which spearheaded the call
for Armenia's independence from the Soviet Union.75
Ter-Petrossian's willingness to negotiate with Azerbaijan
and Turkey about Karabagh's fate (perhaps even allowing
Karabagh to remain an autonomous region of Azerbaijan in
return for a lifting of the crippling Azeri-Turkey blockade) 76 led
to his resignation in 1998. 77 Ter-Petrossian was replaced by
Robert Kocharian, a Karabagh-born prime minister, and ardent
defender of Karabagh's right to decide its own status.
On October 27, 1999, five gunmen entered the Armenian
parliamentary Assembly, killing Prime Minister Vazgen
Sargsian; the President of the National Assembly, Karen
Demirjian; and six other officials. 78 The gunmen surrendered
the next day after holding the surviving Legislative body
hostage overnight. 79 Soon after the capture, the prosecutor's
decisions regarding the indictment of the gunmen and the
nature of the charges to be brought against them ended any
zealous official investigation into a potentially wide-ranging
plot.8 0 The five gunmen were charged as individuals, and the
public investigation of unapprehended conspirators ceased.8 '
74. LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 231-34 (discussing the connection between
Nagorno-Karabakh and the Karabakh Movement in Armenia).
75, Id. at 232-33.
76. HOROWITZ, supra note 28, at 82. Ter-Petrossian had earlier declined to
officially accept the Karabagh Supreme Soviet's declaration of independence from
Azerbaijan. Id. at 81.
77. Id. at 83. Some considered his resignation a "bloodless coup." Id.
78. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 252; BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at
378-79.
79. See Liz Fuller, Armenian Premier, Parliament Speaker Gunned Down, RADIO
FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Oct. 29, 1999, http:www.rferl.org/newsline/
1999/10/2-TCA/tca-291099.asp.
80. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 253 (explaining how the prosecutor's charges
"placed full responsibility of the killings" on the five gunmen).
81. Id. Shortly before the trial of the gunmen began in February 2001, the
incumbent Prosecutor-General resigned and was replaced by President Kocharian. Liz
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The power behind the gunmen, if any, has not been
revealed. Mr. Nairi Hunuanian, the leader of the gunmen, was
convicted of murder in December 2004 and sentenced to life
imprisonment. 82 The war, the trauma of the assassination, and
the farcical trial of the accused perpetrators left deep scars on
the Armenian psyche and public life. 83
The killings removed in one fell swoop Robert Kocharian's
most influential opponents, 84 arousing the enduring suspicions
of Armenians regarding his involvement in the assassination
Fuller, Embattled Armenian Prosecutor General Resigns, RADIO FREE EUR.JRADIO
LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 8, 2001, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/02/2-TCA/tca-
120201.asp. The trial of the five gunmen, which did not begin until February 2001,
continued in Bleak House-like fashion until November 14, 2003. Liz Fuller, Judge
Forestalls Possible New Revelations by Armenian Parliament Gunman, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Nov. 18, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/11 /
181103.asp?po=y. (In Charles Dickens' Bleak House, the case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce
wound its way through the High Court of Chancery for many years. When the case was
ultimately resolved, the estate at the center of the dispute had been depleted by the
Chancery Court and other legal fees. See generally CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE
(Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971) (1853)). The seven-day adjournment that
immediately followed the first days' less-than-two hours of proceedings is symptomatic of
the conduct of the trial. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World - Armenia (2004),
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page-228year=2004RCountry=2881; see also
Liz Fuller, Armenian Parliament Killings Trial Opens, Adjourns..., RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 16, 2001, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/02/
160201.asp#2-tca; Liz Fuller, Armenian Parliament Shootings Trial Resumes, RADIO
FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 23, 2001, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/
2001/02/230201.asp#2-tca. After hearing the testimony of twenty-nine witnesses over the
course of two years, the presiding judge determined that the remaining 101 witnesses
need not testify. See Liz Fuller, Court Seeks to Speed Up Armenian Parliament's
Gunmen's Trial, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Aug. 12, 2003,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/08/120803.asp?po=y.
82. See Armenia Parliament Killers Jailed, BBC NEWS, Dec. 2, 2003, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3256756.stm.
83. LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 252 ("The tragedy of the carnage was paralleled
only by the trauma of the country following the event from which it has yet to recover.").
Throughout the trial, Mr. Hunuanian appeared to taunt the Armenian people and the
relatives of the deceased. Leader of the Gunmen Who Stormed Armenian Parliament
Plans to Run for President, RADIO FREE EUR.IRADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Oct. 3, 2002,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/1O/031002.asp?po=y (reporting, in October 2002,
Hunanian's expressed intention to run for President of the Republic).
84. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 250-52 (citing Kocharian's main opponent as
being Karen Demirjian).
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conspiracy. 85 The elimination of his opponents allowed the
consolidation of more power within the office of the president.8 6
D. Apparent Progress
Despite this tumult, Armenia appears to have made
astonishing progress on the road toward democracy and
international standing. Armenia sought international legitimacy
by, among other things, signing international conventions and
carrying out amendments to its Soviet-era legislation. For
example, Armenia acceded to the following international
conventions: the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 87 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 88 the Convention on the Rights of the Child 89
85. See, e.g., id. at 252; Emil Danielyan, Armenia: Parliament Massacre Still a
Mystery Three Years Later, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIo LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Oct. 28, 2002
http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/10/28102002161752.asp. "We have come to the
conclusion that the crime was aimed at making Robert Kocharian's power unlimited and
uncontrolled." Id. (quoting Albert Bazeyan, an opposition figure). Danielyan further
reported that " [i]n early 2000 [state prosecutors] were close to personally implicating
Kocharian in the killings but backed down for an apparent lack of evidence. This, in
turn, predetermined Kocharian's victory in a seven-month power struggle with
pro-Sarkisian government factions that followed the parliament shootings." Id.
86. LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 253-54 (citing the weakening of various political
branches and an overall decrease in debate). Unsolved political and other assassinations
have been a staple of Armenia's post-Soviet political life. The first wave of such
assassinations, ending in 1994, eliminated several political and business figures,
including the "Soviet-era head of the KGB" and the mayor of Yerevan, the capital city.
Id. at 241-42. The trend continued during the campaign for the 2003 presidential
elections: In December 2002, the head of the national public television and close friend of
the incumbent president, reputedly the possessor of videotapes of and secrets about the
parliamentary assassinations, was murdered as he returned home one night. Liz Fuller,
Senior Armenian Media Official Murdered, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIo LIBERTY NEWSLINE,
Dec. 30, 2002, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/12/301202.asp; Emil Danielyan,
Murder of Armenian State TV Chief Heightens Political Tension, EURASIANET EURASIA
INSIGHT, Jan. 17, 2003, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/
011703a.shtml.
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M.
368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UNHCHR), Ratifications and Reservations, Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.ohchr.org/
english/countries/ratification4.htm.
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and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women. 90
In 2001, the Republic made significant strides in its efforts
to strengthen its relationship with Europe, acceding to the
Council of Europe and ratifying the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 91
In January 2003, Armenia became a member of the World Trade
Organization. 92 To the cursory Western observer, adoption of
these new international obligations reflects a movement toward
recognition and enforcement of fundamental international
norms.
However, 43% of the population lives below the poverty
line,93 and the unemployment rate stands at 30%, 94 stimulating
the emigration of large numbers of the Armenian population, 95
despite an 8% growth in gross domestic product. 96 Together with
89. G.A. Res. 44/25, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Sept. 2 1990); UNHCHR,
Ratifications and Reservations, Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/
ratification/ 11.htm.
90. G.A. Res. 34/180, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34146, (Sept. 3, 1981); UNHCHR,
Ratifications and Reservations, Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/
ratification8.htm.
91. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended
by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, & 8 which entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December
1971, and 1 January 1990, respectively. Consequently, individuals within Armenia's
territory now have standing to bring claims before the European Court of Human Rights
in Strasbourg. See DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW,
POLICY, AND PROCESS 624 (3d ed. 2001) ('The [European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights] applies to every individual within the jurisdiction of all the State parties,
including non-citizens.").
92. See World Trade Organization, Member Information: Republic of Armenia and
the WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/countriese/armeniae.htm (last visited
Apr. 1, 2007).
93. CIA Factbook: Armenia, supra note 52.
94. See Index Mundi, Armenia Unemployment Rate, http://www.indexmundi.coml
armenia/unemploymentrate.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2007). But see, CIA Factbook:
Armenia, supra note 52 (citing an unemployment rate of 7.4% based on a November 2006
estimate).
95. See BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at 356. The primary destination country is
Russia. Id.
96. CIA Factbook: Armenia, supra note 52.
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the phenomena discussed in Parts III and IV infra, the economic
figures suggest that Armenia's reality may be at variance with
the image projected abroad.
III. DEMOCRACY IN ACTION: ARMENIA'S
POST-SOVIET ELECTIONS
"[Tihe ballot box has yet to effect a change of government or
President in an independent Caucasian state. ,o7
Since establishing its independence, Armenia has held seven
presidential and parliamentary elections. 98 Following each
Armenian election, the international community, including the
OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(OSCE/ODIHR) observer missions, has expressed concerns
regarding the freedom and fairness of the proceedings, 99 but
generally has agreed that Armenia is making progress on the
path to democracy. While this may be true in a broad sense, 100
97. EDMUND HERZIG, THE NEW CAUCASUS: ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN AND GEORGIA 33
(1999). Events in the Republic of Georgia in 2003-2004 may signal a positive shift in the
region, perhaps belying Herzig's negative assessment. In response to presidential
elections widely perceived to have been fraudulent, people power demanded and
achieved the re-administration of Georgia's presidential elections. See Hugh Pope,
Pro-West Leaders in Georgia Push Shevardnadze Out, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2003, at Al.
The incumbent's principal challenger was elected by an overwhelming majority of the
popular vote. Seth Mydans, With the Vote in Georgia, a Dynamic Young Leader and a
New Era, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2004 at A3.
98. Presidential elections were held in 1991, 1996, 1998, and 2003; National
Assembly elections were held in 1995, 1999, and 2003. IFES, Country Profile: Armenia,
http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=12. No Armenian elections have yet met
international standards. See OSCE/ODIHR FINAL REPORT ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
IN ARMENIA 1 (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/04/1203_en.pdf
[hereinafter 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT]; OSCE/ODIHR, FINAL REPORT ON
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ARMENIA 1 (July 31, 2003), http://www.osce.org/
documents/odihr/2003/07/533_en.pdf [hereinafter 2003 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
REPORT]; OSCE/ODIHR FINAL REPORT ON PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ARMENIA 1-3
(July 30, 1999), http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1999/07/1217_en.pdf [hereinafter
1999 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT]; OSCE/ODIHR FINAL REPORT ON
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN ARMENIA 3-5 (Apr. 9, 1998), http://www.osce.org/
documents/odihr/1998/04/1215_en.pdf [hereinafter 1998 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
REPORT]; OSCE/ODIHR FINAL REPORT ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN ARMENIA 13-14
(Sept. 24, 1996), http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1996/10/1208_en.pdf [hereinafter
1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT].
99. See sources cited supra note 98.
100. Armenia's progress in the conduct of elections stands in stark contrast to the
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the events of the presidential elections in February and March
2003 and the parliamentary elections in May 2003 can be
viewed as both prism and snapshot, facilitating analysis of the
progress of democracy and the rule of law in Armenia. The
events of February through May of 2003 (and, indeed, the lead-
up to that critical period) demonstrate that the transition to
democracy is in large part legalistic and formalistic, and has not
penetrated to institutional and administrative levels. 10 1 This
negative analysis is more forcefully suggested when the 2003
elections and the 2005 plebiscite to amend the Armenian
Constitution are situated within the history of Armenia's post-
Soviet elections.
Further, review and analysis of the Republic's post-Soviet
elections indicate that fundamental characteristics of
democracy-elections, popular demonstrations, political
parties-are carefully stage-managed to convey a superficial
image of democratic transition. However, the consistently
fraudulent elections reveal an entrenched regime that has
minimized the "free, equal, and secret expression of popular
will."102
A. Democracy and Elections
To undertake to define "democracy" would be a task of
Herculean difficulty and splendor. To create a new definition of
the term is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, before
reviewing Armenia's post-Soviet elections, this Part will attempt
to identify some essential characteristics of democracy.
To break down "democracy" to its component linguistic
parts, it is defined as the rule by the demos, the people.
10 3
more overt disregard for appearances of some of its neighbors. For example, through the
October 2003 presidential elections in Azerbaijan, ailing strongman Heydar Aliyev
officially handed over the reins of the presidency to his son, Ilham Aliyev, among
violence and widespread accusations of fraud. See Editorial, Nepotism in Central Asia,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2003, at A22; Anthony Richter & Svetlana Tsalik, Rich in Oil, Poor
in Everything Else; Making Sure the Money Goes Where It's Supposed To, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2003, at A39.
101. See CAROTHERS, supra note 26. ("It is all too common for countries attempting
political transitions to achieve the forms but not the substance of democracy.").
102. See Franck, The Democratic Entitlement, supra note 19, at 5.
103. Demos, from the Greek, refers to the people of the Greek city states. ELLEN
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However, the demos cannot govern when the population's size
surpasses that of the ancient city states, and expansive
territorial boundaries are commonplace. In the era of the nation
state, rule by the people is possible only through the mechanism
of indirect or representative government. 10 4 That is, given the
size and complexity of the modern polity, the people no longer
have the ability to practice direct democracy, 10 5 that is, to
govern themselves via face-to-face meetings of all the
people/citizens. Instead, a system of representative government
is required, where the people designate the representatives that
will govern them or, better put, designate the representatives
through whom they will govern themselves.
Modern democracy, then, government by the people in a
nation state, involves representation by voters of the entire
polity and populace of the political unit. It involves government
by the people through their elected representatives. Further, it
requires participation, through oversight and quality controls, of
the governance provided by the representatives. Fundamentally,
democracy requires the express consent of the people regarding
the identity of their representative governors and the nature of
that governance.
Why use elections as a lens through which to analyze a
country's transition to democracy and its rule of law reform?
Elections have been called the "traditional acid test" of
democracy 10 6 and "[firee and fair electionsf the sine qua non of
a democratic society."' 0 7 According to this view, elections, the
process through which the people elect their representatives, are
the fundamental test for a functioning democracy. 10 8 It is
MEIKSINS WOOD, DEMOCRACY AGAINST CAPITALISM 204-37 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1995), available at http:/Iwww.iefd.orglarticlesldemos.php.
104. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 245-46
(3d ed. 1950) (questioning the feasibility of rule by the people in scenarios other than
"small and primitive communities with a simple social structure" and pointing to,
instead of "government by the people" the substitution of "government approved by the
people") (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. HERZIG, supra note 97, at 33.
107. Elizabeth F. Defeis, Elections and Democracy: Armenia, A Case Study, 20
Loy. L.A. IN'L & COMP. L. REV. 455, 455 (1998).
108. Id. at 456 (stating that voting is "[clharacterized as a democratic entitlement,
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through the mechanism of elections that the demos participate
in governing itself.10 9 As discussed in Part I supra, Thomas
Franck has identified "the emerging normative requirement of a
participatory electoral process" 110 and the creation of "a
presumption in favor of governance by the free, equal, and secret
expression of popular will."'111
Yet, equally assertive are the voices that maintain the
insufficiency of elections as the measure of the functioning of a
democracy, or as an indicator of the successful transition of a
society. Thomas Carothers warns of the danger of idealizing
elections as democracy achieved: "Elections do not equal
democracy ... [,] they are, at best, only an early step, one that
often leaves underlying political problems largely untouched."112
Susan Gibson notes the inadequacy of elections as an indication
of successful transition: "[c]learly, something more than
elections are required before a country can be said to have a
democratic government-rather than merely having a
democratically-elected government."' 1 3 And Thomas Franck
notes the irony that majoritarian and totalitarian regimes may
be emplaced through the mechanism of elections. 114
Furthermore, Carothers emphasizes the fragility of elections in
transitional countries:
self-governance is emerging as an internationally-protected human right. Yet, the
premise that free elections are a significant indicator of a democratic society has been
challenged.").
109. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 104, at 245-46. In Schumpeter's opinion, it is
the sole mechanism for participation by the people. Id. at 284-85 ("Democracy means
only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to
rule them.... [O]ne aspect of this may be expressed by saying that democracy is the rule
of the politician.") (emphasis added).
110. See Franck, The Emerging Right, supra note 16, at 63.
111. Franck, The Democratic Entitlement, supra note 19, at 5.
112. CAROTHERS, supra note 26, at 336.
113. See Lt. Col. Susan S. Gibson, The Misplaced Reliance on Free and Fair
Elections in Nation Building: The Role of Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of Law,
21 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1998).
114. See Thomas M. Franck, Democracy, Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law:
Linkages, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 169, 171 (Norman Dorsen & Prosser
Gifford eds., 2001) [hereinafter Franck, Democracy, Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law]
(noting that "[e]lections may also conduce to majoritarian totalitarianism").
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Not only are many bad elections still held in
transitional countries, despite the impressive
development of elections assistance, but even when an
election does come off well it often results in less
significant democratic gains than the providers of
electoral aid hoped for. The 1990s have seen many
successful first elections fail to fulfill their promise as
launching pads for democratic transition and
consolidation. Several dozen transitions have moved
from exciting breakthrough elections into stagnation,
backsliding toward authoritarianism, or even
breakdown into civil conflict. Democracy promoters
often regard elections aid as a key that will help open
the door to broader democratization. Once the door is
open, however, the remaining challenges are often
overwhelming. 1 15
Despite, or perhaps in light of, these admonitions, however,
it is undeniable that elections present a crucial test for
democratic or would-be democratic entities. The principal
reasons are two-fold: (1) elections and their conduct are the
mechanism through which the people gives its consent1 16 and
governs itself and (2) elections require that the representatives
previously elected by the people, and holding the reins of power,
be prepared for and acquiesce in their removal from power by
the people.
While conceding that well-run elections, by themselves, do
not signify the successful functioning of a democracy, it is clear
that badly-run elections, whether stemming from lack of
resources or fraudulent intent and lack of respect for the will of
the people, denote a malfunctioning of the democratic process.
Democracy is even more threatened when the conduct of
elections serves to prevent "the free, equal, and secret
expression of popular will."" 17
If well-run elections alone cannot be considered a guarantee
of a functioning democracy, is the reverse true? That is, can
115. CAROTHERS, supra note 26, at 131 (emphasis added).
116. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (stating that
"governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed").
117. Franck, The Democratic Entitlement, supra note 19, at 5.
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consistently fraudulent elections, alone, be considered an
indicator of illusory democratization and adherence to the rule
of law? The conduct of elections and plebiscites in Armenia
raises this fundamental question.
B. Overview of Armenia's Post-Soviet Elections
The first post-Soviet, post-independence election, the
presidential election of October 1991, was generally said to have
been free and fair in light of the Republic's lack of experience
with elections. 118 Those elections brought Levon Ter-Petrossian,
Armenia's first post-Soviet President, to office with a mandate of
83% of the popular vote, 119 riding into office on a cresting wave
of market and political liberalization. 120
However, by the time of the National Assembly elections of
1994, the electoral procedures in Armenia were shrouded in
doubt. 121 The downward trend continued with the presidential
election of September 1996.122 Two years later, Ter-Petrossian
was forced to resign in a bloodless coup orchestrated by
Karabagh-affiliated officials in his administration as well as
members of the military, which was heavily invested, and had
its origins, in the Karabagh conflict. 123
118. HOROWITZ, supra note 28, at 73.
119. LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 208.
120. See id. at 224-31 (describing the challenges presented by the transition to a
market economy).
121. A key opposition party, the ARF, was banned from participation in the
elections on the basis of governmental accusations of terrorist activity. See id. at 238.
The elections were also marred by allegations of fraud and other restrictions placed on
candidate participation. See BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at 375.
122. Among suggestions of electoral misconduct, the incumb.ent, Ter-Petrossian,
narrowly avoided a runoff vote against his principal opponent, Vazgen Manukian, with
an official tally of 51.8% of the votes cast. Pursuant to Armenian law, in order to avoid a
runoff vote, a presidential candidate must receive a simple majority of the popular vote.
See ELECTORAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARM. arts. 84, 85.
123. Ter-Petrossian's overwhelming support in 1991 had dwindled away in the face
of his open willingness to compromise on the Karabagh issue for the sake of
practicality-a compromise for which there was nugatory public or political support. See
HOROWITZ, supra note 28, at 83.
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In accordance with the Armenian Constitution, following the
resignation of Ter-Petrossian's constitutionally-mandated
immediate successor, 124 Robert Kocharian, Ter-Petrossian's
Karabagh-born Prime Minister and second-in-line, was
designated the Republic's second post-Soviet President.125
Kocharian's appointment was confirmed by general elections
that, in accordance with the Armenian Constitution, took place
within forty days of Ter-Petrossian's removal. 126 While Karen
Demirchian accepted the results of the election, there were
rumors that Demirchian, Kocharian's principal opponent, was
the true winner. 127
The next national elections, the May 1998 National
Assembly elections, brought a parliamentary majority to Karen
Demirchian and Vazgen Sargsian, positioning them to challenge
the authority of President Kocharian. 128 Some months after
those elections, the political assassinations described in Part II
were perpetrated in the Parliament. The confusion and power
vacuum created by the killings gave President Kocharian the
opportunity to begin the accumulation of power in the Executive
branch of Armenia.129
1. The 2003 Elections
In February through March and May of 2003, Armenia held
its third presidential and fourth parliamentary elections since
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.130 The first round
of voting in the presidential elections was held on February 19,
124. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 250.
125. Id.
126. 2003 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 4.
127. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 251.
128. Id. at 251.
129. See id. at 253.
130. Press Release, Embassy of the Republic of Armenia to the United States
(Feb. 24, 2003), http://www.armeniaemb.org/News/EmbassyPressReleases/Releases/
SecondRoundElections2003.htm; Julia Hakobyan, Lower Thrnout, Fewer Violations:
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2003.131 As required under Armenian law, a second round of
voting was scheduled since none of the nine candidates had
received the "50% plus one votes"132 mandated by the Electoral
Code. 133 Following accusations of election falsification, 134 mass
demonstrations, and arrests of opposition supporters, 135 the
second round of the elections was held on March 5, 2003.136 The
incumbent, President Robert Kocharian, was declared the
decisive victor, with 67.5% of votes cast. 137
The elections were held in the context of concentrated
reform and support efforts by the international community,
including the U.S. government through the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and its contractors. 138 In
2002-2003, a total of $22.4 million of aid from the United States
was directed toward the municipal, presidential, and National
131. Liz Fuller, Voting Gets Underway in Armenian Presidential Election, RADIO
FREE EUR.[RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 19, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/
2003/02/190203.asp#2-tca.
132. See Liz Fuller, Armenian Presidential Election Will Go to Second Round,
RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 20, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/
newsline/2003/02/200203.asp#2-tca.
133. ELECTORAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARM., arts. 84, 85. According to the
results announced by the Armenian Central Election Commission, the incumbent
received 49.8% of the votes cast, while his closest opponent, Stepan Demirchian, received
27.7%. Liz Fuller, Armenian Presidential Election Will Go to Second Round, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 20, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2O03/02/2-
TCA/tca-200203.asp.
134. Liz Fuller, Armenian Opposition Claims Presidential Election Was Illegal,
RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 21, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/
newsline/2003/02/2-TCAltca. 210203.asp.
135. See infra Part III.E.2. (containing a more detailed description of the arrests).
136. Liz Fuller, Voting Begins in Armenian Presidential Runoff, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Mar. 5, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/
2003/03/050303.asp#2-tca.
137. Armenia President Re-Elected..., RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY
NEWSLINE, Mar. 6, 2003 http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2O03/03/060303.asp#2-tca.
138. United States Agency for Int'l Dev. (USAID) contractors included
ABA/CEELI, IFES (formerly known as the International Foundation for Election
Systems), NDI (National Democratic Institute), and Intermedia, among others. See
USAID, DIRECTORY OF DG OFFICE IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS (2006),
http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy-and-governance/technical-areas/dg-office/par
tners.pdf (listing USAID contractor contact information).
2007]
HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Assembly elections of 2002-2003.139 Other donors included
Armenia's European neighbors, through the offices of the
Council of Europe and the OSCE. 140
The efforts of the international community to help foster free
and fair elections included millions of dollars of assistance, in
the form of, inter alia, technology transfers, monitoring of and
assistance to the media, and trainings of election officials and
the Judiciary in preparation for the elections, media monitoring,
and assistance. 141 Nevertheless, the elections failed to meet
international standards, 142 and raised serious doubts regarding
the validity of the proceedings and their official results. In both
the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2003, the
OSCE/ODIHR election observation missions 143 opined that the
conduct of the proceedings did not meet international standards.
Despite this commitment of resources and conventional
perception of the Republic as a beacon of democracy and
economic progress, the 2003 Armenian elections were neither
free nor fair, 144 evidencing instead a well-thought-out and
coordinated subversion of the democratic process.
2. Referenda
In addition to elections for public office, since its
independence from the Soviet Union, Armenia has held three
referenda. Through the constitutional referendum of 1995, the
Armenian people approved the Republic's first post-Soviet
Constitution. 145 The second referendum on the Constitution,
held in tandem with the parliamentary elections of 2003, did not
139. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Assistance to Armenia-Fiscal Year
2003, Feb. 17, 2004, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/29484.htm.
140. Information regarding the source of the donations is based on the Author's
personal knowledge.
141. Information about the nature of the elections assistance programs is based on
the Author's personal knowledge.
142. See 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98 at 1.
143. A specialized institution of the OSCE, the Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR), promotes democracy and institution-building in OSCE
member states. See, OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,
http://www.osce.orgtodihr/13421.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
144. See infra Part IV (containing a more detailed discussion of 2003 elections).
145. LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 210-18; BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at 374.
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receive voter approval for the proposed constitutional
amendments.1 46 Finally, the contested results of the 2005
constitutional referendum, according to the administration,
confirmed the populace's approval for the proposed
constitutional reforms. 147
C. Post-Soviet Elections Violation Trends
A review of the OSCE/ODIHR final election reports issued
after the 1996, 1998, 1999, and 2003 elections reveal recurring
trends in Armenian electoral violations. This analysis will
highlight a number of the more fundamental defects in the
conduct of the elections that undermine the freedom and
fairness of the Armenian electoral process as observed by the
OSCE/ODIHR.
1. Access to Media:
In its 1996 Presidential Elections Report, the OSCE/ODIHR
mission noted that the incumbent President received the lion's
share of electronic media coverage, and that the vast majority of
such coverage was favorable. 148 The report noted with concern
that the state of the media in Armenia, and the economic
circumstances of the majority of its citizens, created a heavy
reliance by voters on electronic media for information about the
elections and candidates, as only electronic media provided
nationwide coverage. 149 The state television station, in defiance
of electoral laws and regulations, did not provide equal coverage
of all candidates. 150
146. Liz Fuller, Armenia: Armenian Voters Reject Proposed Constitutional
Amendments, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, May 29, 2003,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/05/290503.asp#2.tca.
147. See infra Part V.C.2 (containing a more detailed discussion of the 2005
constitutional referendum).
148. See 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98 at 6 (stating that
"according to the Media Monitoring conducted by the European Institute for the Media,
supported by the EU's TACIS democracy program, Levon Ter-Petrossian had a
substantial advantage over his opponents during the election period").
149. See 2003 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 14.
150. 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 6. President Ter-
Petrossian was given 1,050 minutes of coverage, while his three main opponents
together received 150.5 minutes of coverage. Id.
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The failure of media outlets to adhere to Armenian electoral
law and the discriminatory nature of coverage continued to be a
significant problem during the presidential and National
Assembly elections in 1998, 1999 and 2003.151
2. Voter Lists
The observer mission in 1996 pointed to the inadequacy of
the voter lists, the lack of coordination and the lack of
transparency in their production, and their overall inaccuracy,
as important elements in the conduct of Armenia's elections. 152
Nevertheless, throughout the ensuing OSCE/ODIHR reports,
covering elections in 1998, 1999, and 2003, the flaws in the voter
lists continued to bedevil the conduct of elections in Armenia. 153
The most serious allegations were the inclusion of the deceased
and nonresident, the removal of current residents, and the
failure to post lists at polling stations prior to elections, as
required by the election laws. 154
3. Military Voting
The 1996 report noted observations of voting by military
units where soldiers were brought to polling stations, instructed
on the substance of their vote, and subjected to open voting in
151. See 1998 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 5-6; 1999
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 16 (reporting only minor
violations); 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 12-14; 2003
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 15-16 (reporting positive
developments in comparison with the coverage of the presidential elections earlier that
year). The pattern of improvements in performance during parliamentary elections
followed by downswings during presidential elections appears to be well-established.
152. See 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 4-5.
153. See 1998 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 12, 21; 1999
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 14-15, 20-21; 2003 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 8, 15; 2003 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT,
supra note 98, at 9-10, 25 ("As in previous elections, the accuracy of the voter lists was of
concern and most political parties have little confidence in them."); see also infra Part
W.A.
154. See, e.g., 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 8; 1999
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 20.
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view of their commanding officers. 155 Similar observations were
made in the majority of subsequent Armenia election reports. 156
4. Ballot Stuffing
Allegations and direct observations of ballot stuffing157 were
included in the 1996 report of the OSCE/ODIHR. 158 Similar
allegations, varying only with respect to scope and frequency of
the occurrence of the reported activity, appear in most of the
subsequent election reports. 15
9
5. Flaws in Counting and Vote Verification
Among the flaws observed in the counting of ballots, the
1996 election observer teams reported: failure to conduct the
count in accordance with Armenia's Electoral Code,
discrepancies among the number of ballots received by
individual polling stations, the total number of ballots reported
by the polling stations, and the final count of registered voters
released by the Armenian Central Electoral Commission
155. See 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 8. Open voting
means that the vote was not private, but subject to implied penalty by supervising
officers. Id.
156. See 1998 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 8; 1999
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 21; 2003 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 21 ("Observers also noted problems with military
voting, including open voting .. "). The absence of such observations during the
subsequent 2003 Parliamentary elections repeats the trends of upswings in performance
between Armenia's Presidential and Parliamentary elections.
157. In ballot stuffing, an individual, or individuals, inserts more than one ballot
into the ballot box. See, e.g., Armenia: Election Marred by Intimidation, Ballot Stuffing.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mar. 7, 2003, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/03/07/
armeni5383.htm [hereinafter Armenia: Election Marred].
158. See 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 9.
159. See 1998 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 8-11; 2003
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 19-21; 2003 PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 19; see also infra Part IV.E.
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(ACEC).160  Similar flaws were reported in each of the
subsequent Armenian election reports. 161
6. Presence of Unauthorized Persons in Polling Stations
The 1996 report of the OSCE/ODIHR recounts the presence
in polling stations of a large number of unauthorized persons,
including military or law enforcement personnel and
representatives of the Ministry of Interior, among others. 162 The
report noted the danger of intimidation of voters and
recommended that this problem be addressed. 163 Nevertheless,
intimidation of voters and the presence of unauthorized persons
in polling stations during Armenian elections and election
campaigns continued to recur in all subsequent elections in the
Republic. 164
Other apparent trends in the shortcomings reported
surrounding the conduct of a majority of the post-Soviet
Armenian elections, particularly the presidential elections,
include the co-opting of state resources to the election campaign
of the incumbent administration, 165 intimidation, and violence
160. See 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 10-13.
161. See 1998 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 10-11, 14; 1999
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 22; 2003 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 20; 2003 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT,
supra note 98, at 18-19; see also infra Part 1V.E.
162. See 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 8.
163. Id. at 14.
164. See 1998 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 6-7; 1999
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 19-20; 2003 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 19, 21; 2003 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT,
supra note 98, at 17-18; see also infra Part IV.D.
165. For example, the state-owned media has consistently favored the incumbent
in its campaign coverage. See 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at
6; 1998 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 5-6; 2003 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 12-13. Other state resources were also pressed
into the service of the incumbent. 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98,
at 10.
The widespread use of public resources in favor of the incumbent was
confirmed by observers around the country. Some public officials at the local
level were engaged full-time in running the incumbent's campaign while
performing their official duties.... Public buildings such as mayors' offices
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directed toward opposition candidates and members of the
public, 166 and lack of security of ballots or ballot boxes, 167 such
that ballots are openly and illegally circulated outside polling
stations during the conduct of the elections. 168
D. Theatrical Non-Reform Reform?
The ongoing nature of these flaws notwithstanding, Armenia
undertook a number of overt initiatives to combat the defects in
the conduct of its elections.
1. The Electoral Code
The first example of such initiatives is the promulgation of a
wide-ranging Electoral Code, enacted and first employed in the
1999 National Assembly elections and amended for the 2003
elections. 169 The Electoral Code replaced the 1996 Law of the
Republic of Armenia on the Election of the President of the
Republic of Armenia and the 1996 Law of the Republic of
Armenia on the Effects of Local Self-Governing Bodies. 170 The
enactment of the Electoral Code and its subsequent amendment
were commonly used for campaign purposes, overwhelmingly by the
incumbent's team.
Id.
In this regard, as with respect to other repeated trends described above, a significant
improvement in performance occurred between the presidential and parliamentary
elections.
166. 1998 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 5 ('The most serious
and well-substantiated case was the distribution of kerosene outside of Mr. Kocharian's
headquarters in Yerevan."); 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION REPORT, supra note 98, at 9-
11 (reporting, among other things, outbreaks of violence during opposition campaign
meetings, dismissal or threatened dismissal of individuals associated with opposition
campaigns, and threats to business owners who displayed opposition campaign posters).
167. Armenia: Election Marred, supra note 157; 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
REPORT, supra note 98, at 19 (describing the circulation of signed and stamped ballots
outside polling booths and the delivery of 400 blank ballots to the Election Observation
Mission's office in Yerevan).
168. Id.
169. See 1999 PARLLAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 3-4; 2003
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 3.
170. See 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 2; 1999
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 3-4.
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were both greeted with approval by the OSCE Election
Observation Missions. 171
2. Armenian Voter Lists
Second, in preparation for the 1999 National Assembly
elections, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
initiated a wide-ranging program to clean up and clarify the
Armenian voter list. 172 Nevertheless, the voter lists continued to
be generated by local authorities, with little or no coordination,
resulting in the absence of a master voter list from which
duplication could be verified. 173
3. The Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting
Finally, the Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting, was
adopted for the 2003 elections. 174 Article 28 of the new media
law mandates impartial and equal access of electoral candidates
to state media outlets. 175 In addition, several provisions of the
Electoral Code require equality of media access for all
candidates. 176 Both legislative efforts constitute significant
improvements over preexisting laws.
4. Memoranda of Understanding
Other reform initiatives included various Memoranda of
Understanding between the Armenian government (acting
through the ACEC) and various international organizations. The
memoranda provided for training of the electoral commission
members, voters, domestic election observers, judges, and others
who play a crucial role in the conduct of elections in Armenia. 177
171. 1999 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 3.
172. Id. at 8 (describing the initiation of a wide-ranging technical assistance
project designed to "improve the quality of voter lists").
173. 2003 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 10 ("Armenia has
no centralized civil or voter register to safeguard against potential multiple entries
across community borders.").
174. See WALKER, supra note 32, at 11 (2004).
175. 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 12.
176. See ELECTORAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARM. arts. 18, 20, 51, 81.
177. This is a personal observation of the Author, who participated in organizing
training sessions for the judiciary in preparation for the 2003 presidential elections.
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E. Post-reform 2003 Election Violations
Most of these efforts were undertaken prior to the 2003
elections or were conducted in anticipation of those elections.
However, they did not lead to improvements in the conduct of
Armenian elections.
Despite several far-ranging initiatives, the text of the
OSCE/ODIHR's Report on the 1996 Armenian presidential
election, which described the shortcomings perceived by
OSCE/ODIHR's election observer mission and outlined
recommendations made by the mission to alleviate those
problems, might have been lifted wholesale and reinserted into
the OSCE/ODIHR's 2003 presidential elections report with little
substantive change in details. 178 Such has been the de facto
effect of ameliorative initiatives undertaken to enhance the
Armenian electoral system.
1. Voter Lists
The problems observed included incomplete or inaccurate
voter lists, ballot stuffing, carousel voting, tabulation violations,
and intimidation. 179
2. Intimidation and Violence
While the voting itself was relatively calm, violence hovered
like a miasma and included attacks on journalists and
candidates' staff. 180
178. Compare, for example, 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98,
at 14 with 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 24,25, 26.
179. 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 1, 7, 9, 17-22, 24.
180. In early February 2003, a member of Parliament who served as a key player
for one of the presidential candidates was stabbed during a campaign rally. Liz Fuller,
Armenian Presidential Candidate's Campaign Manager Stabbed, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 5, 2003, http://rferl.org/newsline/2003/02/2.
TCA/tca-050203.asp. Violence against journalists included a grenade attack in broad
daylight and the night time shooting and death of another. Liz Fuller, Armenian
Journalist Injured in Grenade Attack, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Oct.
23, 2002, http://rferl.org/newsline/2002/10/2-TCA/tca-231002.asp; Senior Armenian
Media Official Murdered, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Dec. 30, 2002,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/12/301202.asp; 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
REPORT, supra note 98, at 12.
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Further, in the interval between the first and second rounds
of the presidential elections, popular protests by thousands of
citizens, led by the opposition candidates, who alleged massive
fraud during the elections, 181 were countered by the arrests at
night at the homes of opposition election staffers. 182 The accused
were tried and convicted in closed trials 183 and "coincidentally"
received sentences ensuring they would be unavailable to
participate in the second round of campaigning. 184
181. Liz Fuller, Thousands Protest Armenian Election Falsification, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 24, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/
2003/02/240203.asp#2-tca [hereinafter Thousands Protest] (describing a rally of 25,000
people in the capital, led by opposition candidates).
182. Liz Fuller, Police Arrest Armenian Opposition Candidate's Supporters, RADIO
FREE EUR./RADIo LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 24, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/
2003/02/2-TCA/tca-240203.asp [hereinafter Police Arrest] ("During the night of 21-22
February, Armenian police rounded up 'dozens' of Demirchian's supporters who were
sentenced behind closed doors in legal proceedings on 22 February to 15-day prison
sentences .. "); see also Liz Fuller, More Supporters of Armenian Presidential
Challenger Arrested, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 28, 2003,
http:lHwww.rferl.org/newsline/2003/O2/2-TCAItca-280203.asp [hereinafter Supporters].
183. 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 10 ("Many of the
hearings were closed; the accused in general did not have legal counsel present."). The
arrests and secret sentences violated the Armenian Constitution, which proclaims that
"[c]itizens are entitled to hold peaceful and unarmed meetings, rallies, demonstrations
and processions." ARM. CONST. OF 1995, art. 26. The Armenian Constitution states that
"[e]veryone is entitled to legal counsel from the moment he or she is arrested, detained,
or charged." Id. art. 40.
184. The first round of the elections was held on February 19, 2003. 2003
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 165, at 3. The Electoral Code requires a
second round, when necessary, be held "on the 14th day after voting." ELECTORAL CODE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARM. art. 85. Thus, detentions of fifteen days prevented the
participation of campaign workers in the period between the two rounds of voting. Even
before the 2003 campaign, the unchecked use of violence to quell dissent was
demonstrated by the killing, allegedly by one of President Kocharian's bodyguards, of
Poghos Poghosian, a civilian who had expressed negative views about Kocharian. Liz
Fuller, No Arrests in Death of Armenian Activist, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY
NEWSLINE, Oct. 2, 2001, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2O01/10/2-TCA/tca-O21001.asp
("Poghos Poghosian was found dead with head and stomach injuries in the cafe toilet
shortly after [President] Kocharian left the premises. Law enforcement officials initially
said that Poghosian, who was 43, died of heart failure."). Mr. Poghosian was brutally
beaten to death in the bathroom of a nightclub in downtown Yerevan, the capital of
Armenia. Id. Aghmal Harutiunian, the only one of Kocharian's bodyguards to be charged
with a crime, was charged with murder; however, he received the minimum legal penalty
after a conviction of manslaughter. Liz Fuller, Armenian President's Bodyguard
Convicted of Manslaughter, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 21, 2002,
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3. Media
Prior to elections, the media was intimidated. Two neutral
television stations lost their broadcast licenses through curious
machinations of the government agency in charge of auctioning
licenses. 185 The stations that did remain on the air, including
the national public television, were unabashedly pro-
incumbent. 186
4. State Resources
During the campaign, governmental resources were coopted
to the use of the incumbent, in clear violation of Armenia's own
election laws. 187
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/02/2-TCA/tca-210202.asp ("Harutiunian pleaded
guilty to manslaughter, having told the court last month that he gave Poghosian a
'gentle shove' that caused him to lose his balance and fall, incurring fatal head
injuries."). Harutiunian received a one year suspended sentence. Id. Additionally,
"[s]everal witnesses testified they saw a group of men assaulting Poghosian after the
latter addressed insulting remarks to Kocharian, but that Harutiunian was not one of
them." Id. (emphasis added). Members of the Armenian public believe the circumstances
of the killing have been covered up. Liz Fuller, Armenians Protest Jazz Concert at
Murder Cafr, RADIO FREE EuR./RADIo LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Apr. 23, 2002,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/04/2-TCA/tca-230402.asp.
185. See 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 11-12; see also
Emil Danielyan, Thousands Rally in Yerevan to Condemn Al Plus Closure, Apr. 5, 2002,
http://www.armenialiberty.org/armeniareport/report/en/2002/04/B15ODA1-186B-4913-
9A10-40C03D223AAD.asp; Liz Fuller, Thousands Rally to Condemn Independent TV
Closure, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Apr. 8, 2002, http://www.rferl.
org/newsline/2002/04/2.TCA/tca-080402.asp. The two private broadcast stations, A1+
and Noyan Tappan, had been expected to offer independent reporting about the
elections. See 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 11-12. However,
beginning in 2002, Al+'s broadcast license was rescinded, and its attempt to bid on new
licenses that would enable the station to broadcast in time for the elections were
entrapped in a curiously dilatory tender process that remained unresolved even after the
conduct of the parliamentary elections. Liz Fuller, Embattled Armenian TV Channel
Submits Bid for New Frequency, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, June 10,
2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/06/2-TCA/tca- 100603.asp; Liz Fuller,
Embattled Armenian Television Station Loses Tender for Frequency, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, June 12, 2003, http://www.rferl.com/newsline/2OO3/06/2-
TCA/tca- 120603.asp.
186. See 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 12-14.
187. See 2003 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 13. Such co-
opting by incumbent leaders is not unusual. See, e.g., Frank Emmert, Administrative
and Court Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, 9 EUR. L.J. 288, 304 (July 2003)
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F. Role of the International Community
Despite substantial contributions to the Armenian economy
and continued engagement with the government and other
institutions of public life, the events of the elections demonstrate
the impotence of the international community in the face of
Armenia's illusory democratic and rule of law reform. The
impotence is manifested in the exhortations and
recommendations made by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe (the Assembly or PACE). 188 In successive
opinions targeted at Armenia's repeated use of administrative
detentions to quell political dissent, both during electoral
campaigns and in other circumstances, the Assembly has
condemned the use of the detention mechanism. 189 For example,
in response to events that took place in Armenia in the period
between the two rounds of the 2003 presidential elections, the
Assembly declared in Resolution 1361:
14. The Assembly is shocked by the scandalous use that
continues to be made of the arbitrary procedures
concerning administrative detention provided for in the
Administrative Code, which is totally incompatible with
its strongly-worded statement in Resolution 1304 of
September 2002 that the Armenian authorities should
no longer make use of these procedures. It firmly
condemns the arrest and conviction of over 270 people -
members of the opposition parties, sympathizers and
office-holders - between the two rounds of the
presidential election and at the end of the second round.
("[T]he Soviet culture of using the public administration for political ends and sometimes
even for personal advantage has still not been fully overcome.").
188. The Assembly (PACE) is one of the two statutory organs of the Council of
Europe, and is composed of a Committee of Ministers, as well as an Assembly, which
represents the political forces within member states. See Council of Europe,
Parliamentary Assembly, The Framework, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?Link=/
AboutUs/APCE framework.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007). The powers of PACE,
performed through various committees, include monitoring, and issuing
recommendations, opinions, and resolutions. See Council of Europe, Parliamentary
Assembly, http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Committee/PACECommitteesInfoListingE.asp
(last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
189. Eur. Parl. Ass., Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Armenia, Res.
1361, 3d Sess., Doc. No. 10027 (Jan. 27, 2004), available at http://assembly.coe.int/
Documents/AdoptedText/ta04/ERES1361.htm.
[Vol. 29:3
SMOKE, MIRRORS, AND THE JOKER IN THE PACK
It expects the Armenian authorities to discuss by
February 2004 the issue of administrative detention
provided for in the Administrative Code in co-operation
with Council of Europe experts and to send the draft
amendments for the Council of Europe's expertise by
April 2004.190
However, despite stern wording, these exhortations had
little effect. They were followed by these statements in
Resolution 1374 of PACE:
5. With regard to the conduct of the authorities, the
Parliamentary Assembly recalls that its actions are
contrary to the spirit and to the letter of the
recommendations formulated in its Resolution 1361
(2004) on the honoring of obligations and commitments
by Armenia, adopted in January 2004. It is particularly
concerned with the fact that:
i. arrests, including those carried out on the basis of the
Administrative Code, ignored the demand to
immediately end the practice of administrative
detention and to change the Administrative Code used
as a legal basis for this practice;
ii. the authorities refused to authorize opposition rallies
for reasons not permitted under the European
Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, the new draft
law on the procedure for conducting gatherings,
meetings, rallies and demonstrations, currently
undergoing parliamentary procedure, was evaluated as
excessively restrictive by experts of the Venice
Commission; 191
190. Id.
191. See Eur. Parl. Ass., Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Armenia,
Res. 1374, 13th Sess., Doc. No. 10163 (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://assembly.coe.
int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta04/ERES1374.htm. The Council of Europe's European
Commission for Democracy through Law (known as the Venice Commission) is an
advisory body created to provide constitutional assistance following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union. See Council of Europe, Venice Commission, http://www.venice.coe.int/
site/main/presentationE.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2007). Members of the Commission
include all Council of Europe members. Id. In addition to constitutional assistance, the
Commission is active in the sphere of elections and referenda, cooperation with
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iii. persons detained during the recent events were
reportedly subjected to brutality and ill-treatment by
police and security forces while in custody, in spite of
the Assembly's demands that resolute and more active
steps be taken to remedy misconduct by law
enforcement officials;
iv. freedom of expression continues to be seriously
curtailed and several acts of violence against
journalists, which took place during the recent events,
were carried out, or were allowed to happen, by the
police and security forces. 192
Clearly demonstrating the impotence of the international
community, the repeated condemnations from the Assembly,
beginning in September 2002, spurred no ameliorative action
addressing the targeted electoral campaign violations, that is,
abuse of the administrative detention mechanism-on the part
of the Armenian authorities whether before, during, or after the
2003 elections. 193
G. Implications of the 2003 Election Violations for Democracy
in Armenia
A review of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission
2003 Reports raises a strong suspicion that the election
violations and discrepancies from international electoral norms
are no accident, but instead are successful tactics employed in
previous Armenian election cycles. Indeed, two months after the
presidential elections, when the stakes for the incumbent
constitutional courts, and transnational studies and reports. See Council of Europe,
Venice Commission, The activities of the Commission, http://www.venice.coe.inti
site/main/ActivitiesE.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
192. See EUR. PARL. ASS., Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Armenia,
Res. 1374, 13th Sess., Doc. No. 10163 (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://assembly.coe.
int/Documents/AdoptedText/taO4ERES1374.htm (addressing official Armenian
government response to a series of popular demonstrations held in Yerevan in April
2004).
193. See Police Arrest, supra note 182; Supporters, supra note 182.
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administration were considerably lower, 194 the parliamentary
elections witnessed a substantial improvement in execution. 195
However, observers can take no comfort in the
improvements. The positive changes that took place between the
2003 presidential and parliamentary elections mirror the
improvements effected between the presidential and
parliamentary elections of 1998 and 1999.196 The conduct of the
elections and the improvement from the presidential to
parliamentary round, instead of providing evidence of
amelioration, may merely indicate the cynicism of the power
structure. Further, the recurring pattern indicates that, rather
than lacking the resources and know-how to conduct elections
that meet international election norms, there may be inadequate
institutional incentive or will to attain those standards--or,
worse, an intentional manipulation of the electoral
machinery. 197
In the eyes of Western officials, and some Armenians, the
fact the protests following the 2003 presidential elections were
not met with violence and instead were allowed to proceed over
a period of several weeks, may appear to be an indication that
rule of law reform has penetrated into the political life of the
country. 198 However, the targeted secret arrests, trials, and
convictions of opposition supporters belie this view. Rather, the
apparent democratic development of tolerance for open protest
can be viewed as smokescreens and mirrors used by the power
194. As a consequence of the concentrated presidential power provided for in the
Armenian Constitution, and divisions among the many opposition parties, the heart of
Armenian political power rests with the Executive and not with the Legislature. See
infra Part V.B.
195. See 2003 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 1 ('The
25 May 2003 parliamentary elections in the Republic of Armenia marked an
improvement over the 2003 presidential election in the campaign and media coverage,
but fell short of international standards .... ").
196. See id.; 1999 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 2 ("[T]he
1999 electoral process in Armenia generally showed an improvement over the flawed
elections of 1995, 1996 and 1998... ").
197. See, e.g., CAROTHERS, supra note 26, at 335 ('If a leader or government wants
to distort or subvert an electoral process, which many still do, external electoral aid
rarely stops them. The art of manipulating elections has developed just as rapidly as the
art of aiding elections.').
198. See, e.g., Thousands Protest, supra note 181.
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elite to weave the illusion of reform. The dramatic
improvements from the presidential to parliamentary elections
starkly demonstrate the presidential-round violations were
deliberate-with illegal methodologies systematically deployed
when the stakes of power retention were higher.
IV. ELECTORAL NARRATIVES
The first person1 99 and other narratives about the 2003
Armenian presidential elections are included here to give color
to the popular Armenian perception of the 2003 presidential
elections, as well as the experiences of a foreign observer.
Employment of the narrative devices here encapsulates and
gives flesh to otherwise potentially sterile discussions of
violations of electoral procedures.
"People who have grown up and lived in Europe cannot
understand our mentality. They have their rules and views on
democracy, and we have ours."200
A. Voting Armenian Style
In the interval between the first and second round of the
presidential campaign of 2003, a joke made the rounds of
Yerevan, the Armenian capital city, demonstrating the
populace's weariness and cynicism regarding the electoral
process. The joke went something like this: A man from Malatia
went to the polling station to vote. As he handed over his ID and
bent over to sign the voter list, he noticed that his father, dead
lo these last three years, had voted before him and signed the
199. The Author was an observer of the second round of the Armenian presidential
election of March 2003. The observation was conducted under the auspices of the
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission in Armenia.
200. .. . As Defense Minister Dismisses International Criticism, RFE/RL
NEWSLINE, Mar. 10, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/03/100303.asp#2-tca
(quoting Serzh Sargsian's defiant response to OSCE criticisms of the conduct of the
Armenian presidential elections); see also 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra
note 98 (detailing criticisms of the Armenian Presidential Elections, held during
February through March of 2003).
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voter list. "That wretched old man!" he thought bitterly. "Three
long years, and he didn't even have the decency to come visit me
and his grandchildren!"20 1
B. The Knock on the Door & Carousel Voting
An Armenian acquaintance recounted to the Author her
experience with carousel voting:20 2 A week prior to the
presidential election, a knock on her apartment door presaged
the appearance of two gentlemen who offered a certain number
of Armenian drams 20 3 in return for her agreement to vote for the
incumbent. In order to ensure she carried out her commitment,
on the day of the election she would be required to check in with
the contact person, receive a pre-checked ballot, and return to
the handler the blank ballot given to her at the polling station.
Only after completing these steps would she receive the
promised payment.20 4
C. No Unchecked Ballots
Another Armenian acquaintance returned to her small
village to vote.20 5 Despite movement of a large part of the rural
population to Yerevan, the capital city, many citizens continue
to be registered in their home villages. Upon entering the polling
station and presenting her identification, she was handed a
ballot already checked for the incumbent. A sophisticated
resident of Yerevan, my acquaintance demanded she be given a
201. See 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 21
("International observers also reported.., voting on behalf of deceased or absent
persons. . . ").
202. See id. at 19 n.2 ('Carousel voting' involves voters in sequence casting
premarked ballot papers in substitution for the blank ballot papers they receive at the
polling station; the blank ballot is smuggled out and premarked for the next participant.
Voters are often paid to participate in such a scheme.").
203. Armenia's currency, the dram, floats against the U.S. dollar, the euro, and
the ruble.
204. 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 19 n.2 ('Carousel'
voting was observed .... ").
205. Armenians must vote in the localities in which they are registered as
residents. See ELECTORAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARM. arts. 10(1), 11(1)-(2).
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clean ballot. The puzzled village election officials were unable to
comply, as every ballot in the precinct had been pre-checked for
the incumbent President.20 6
D. The Second Round: Observing the Vote
I was an official international observer for the OSCE
observer mission for the second round of the 2003 Armenian
presidential election. My partner, a U.S. Embassy employee, and
I were driven through the streets of our assigned precincts in
Yerevan in a large white SUV that flew the blue and white
OSCE flag. We noticed as we approached various polling
stations, there was a flurry of movement outside followed by a
mini exodus of individual civilians. Voters? Or persons not
authorized to gather in the polling stations?
At the second precinct we visited, we were approached by a
middle-aged woman who haltingly relayed her complaint to us
through our driver-translator. She explained that her two
children lived in Moscow; however, when she came to the
precinct to vote, as she bent over the voter list to sign her name,
she noticed her son's and daughter's names had been signed on
the list, indicating they had already voted. But neither of them
had traveled home from Moscow! What should she do?
Knowing the courts of first instance would be open all day to
enable those erroneously omitted from the voter lists to be
reinstated and allowed to vote, we advised her to go to the
nearest court to complain. But would she be able to have the
names struck?
When I relayed the story to my Armenian acquaintances,
they laughed knowingly. 'Yes, the dead, the migrated, and the
moved-away all voted in these elections!" they said.20 7
206. 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 22 (highlighting the
unusual phenomenon in several precincts where the official count indicated 100% of the
vote had been cast for the incumbent); "Tihe official statistics included a number of
implausible figures:
0 12 polling stations where the incumbent won every vote
* 96 polling stations where the incumbent won more than 90% of the vote
* 11 polling stations with 100% voter turnout, and almost 100 polling stations with
over 90% turnout." Id.
207. See id. at 21.
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E. The Second Round: Observing the Count
"It's not who you vote for that matters, but who counts the
votes. 2 08
These were the wee hours of election night; the majority of
Yerevan's residents were long abed. My partner and I sped
through the streets, following what we hoped were the ballots
from the polling station we had just observed.
We chose that particular station because the election
officials had seemed rather uneasy when we visited earlier in
the day, and were visibly relieved when we announced we were
leaving. Shocked at our unexpected return toward the end of
election day, the chairman of the precinct electoral commission
insisted we sit a full twelve feet across the room away from the
action we had come to see-the counting of the vote.
Nevertheless, thanks to the transparent ballot boxes the ACEC
had been persuaded to use,209 we could keep a somewhat close
watch.
The chairman would pull out an individual ballot, announce
his determination of the candidate in support of whom it had
been cast or, if it was a spoiled ballot, and hand it over to the
other committee members. An initial lead by the challenger was
whittled away by thickly enwrapped mother loads of pro-
incumbent ballots that the chairman visibly wrestled to separate
in order to take them from the ballot box. The final
determination after many hours of counting was that the
incumbent had carried the polling station.
Then came the hard part for the precinct electoral
commission: making the numbers look legitimate. The number
of votes counted, including the spoiled ones, exceeded the
number of voters on the precinct's list, that is, the number of
ballots counted exceeded the number of ballots delivered to the
precinct in preparation for the vote and signed for by the
committee. 210 How would the precinct electoral commission
208. HERZIG, supra note 97, at 33 (quoting Joseph Stalin).
209. Liz Fuller, Armenia to Use Transparent Ballot Boxes for Presidential Poll,
RADIO FREE EUR.IRADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 4, 2003, http:/www./rferl.org/newsline/
2003/02/040203.asp.
210. Each precinct receives ballots that amount to 103% of the number of voters on
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resolve this? It was a simple matter to change the numbers to
match the official number of voters assigned to that precinct.
A committee member representing an opposition candidate
loudly protested the arithmetical contortions to no avail and
finally stalked out. He did not sign the precinct's official count
document (the "protocol") that must be submitted with the
ballots at a central location. The committee continued to fill out
the form, and the chairman ordered us to leave the room for a
few minutes. "Is this right?" we asked ourselves. "Can he do
that? Did our training cover this issue?" Once we had begun to
observe the count, we were not supposed to let the ballots out of
our sight. But we didn't have an armed soldier on our side-they
did. We decided to wait in the car. As we waited, a car sped out
of the precinct. "After them!" we yelled to our translator-driver.
"They've got the ballots! They're trying to get away."
We thought we had kept them in sight, but by the time we
showed our ID cards at the central location some miles away, we
lost sight of them. We were then directed to a small
antechamber where we found several other teams of official
observers. We all were tired and wound up. We swore we would
wait until our polling station's number was called. We wanted to
see whether the protocol reflected the nonmatching counts and
the absence of the opposition committee member.
Several hours later, dawn breaking in the sky, outwaited,
outwitted, and outlasted, we left. Our precinct had not been
called. We were too tired and had to go home. We agreed to
make a note of this matter in our report, but realized we would
not be present to challenge the official submission by the
precinct electoral commission. We assumed a forged signature
had been submitted and the doctored count had been matched to
the official numbers for the precinct. 211
the voter list for that precinct. The extra 3% of ballots is intended to allow for spoilage.
ELECTORAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARM. art. 114(7).
211. 2003 ARMENIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONs REPORT, supra note 98, at 20
(describing negative assessments of the counting process by a significant proportion of
international observer teams). For a contemporaneous media account of electoral
misdeeds, see Elections Recapped: What Will It Take to Get It Right?, ARM. INT'L MAG.,
Aug.-Sept. 2003, at 42 [hereinafter Elections Recapped] ("Armenian genious [sic] showed
itself this spring. Under the watchful eyes of half the country, and some of Europe, the
most clever ways of subverting a simple voting process were devised.")
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V. THE RULE OF LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
Through an examination of the 1995 Constitution of the
Republic of Armenia, particularly the status of judges under the
Constitution, this Part assesses the rule of law in Armenia. The
role played by the Judiciary and the law during the 2003
elections exemplifies the gap between the appearance and
reality of rule of law reform in Armenia, as do the process and
events leading to amendment of the 1995 Constitution.
A. The Rule of Law
Defining the term "rule of law" would be no less arduous
than attempting to define democracy. 212 This Article neither
creates nor attempts to adopt a single definition of the rule of
law; Professor Brian Tamanaha describes the rule of law as,
"stand[ing] in the peculiar state of being the preeminent
legitimating political ideal in the world today, without
agreement upon precisely what it means. '213 However, the three
clusters of meaning of this "conceptual concept," identified by
Professor Tamanaha: (1) law as a limit on governmental
power;214 (2) formal legality (or rule by rules);215 and (3) "the
rule of law, not man"216 illuminate attributes of the term as
referred to in this Article.
The rule of law is thought to be essential to the functioning
of a democracy, as law provides the rules to which the citizens
and population of a polity and their government (Legislative,
Judicial, and Executive branches) will adhere. Professor Thomas
M. Franck expresses the interaction between the rule of law and
democracy as follows: "To counteract the tendency of democracy
to corruption and illegitimacy, societies have sought relief
through the rule of law. '217 Professor Franck further notes "[t]he
212. See supra Part III.A.
213. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY
4 (2004).
214. Id. at 137.
215. Id. at 139-40.
216. Id. at 140.
217. Franck, Democracy, Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law, supra note 114, at 173.
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need to balance democracy and safeguard legitimacy through
implementation of a rule of law has been widely recognized in
the recent global resurgence of democracy. ' 218 In a democracy,
the rule of law functions to restrain the actions of the people and
of the representatives through whom they govern themselves.
The rule of law operates to restrain: (1) the peoples' leader-
representatives in their interaction with the people; (2) the
people in their interaction with each other; (3) the people in
their interaction with their representatives; and (4) the state in
its interactions with the people and with other states.
Fundamentally, then, the rule of law maintains an equilibrium
among relevant actors. 2 19
B. Constitutional Framework and the Role of the Judiciary
In a constitutional order, the constitution is the
fountainhead from which springs the substantive and
procedural principles and laws, adherence to which signifies the
rule of law. The Judiciary's function is integral to the
functioning of the legal framework in its capacity as the neutral
arbiter of disputes and interpreter of the laws. In order for the
law and the rule of law to fulfill their functions, not only must
the substantive and procedural content of the legal framework
facilitate those functions, but the Judiciary must be empowered
to uphold those procedural and substantive roles.
The 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Armenia was in
effect during most of the elections described in Part III,
including the 2003 elections. Via a plebiscite, described in this
Part, the 1995 Constitution was replaced by a newly-amended
Constitution. By its terms, the 2005 Constitution will come into
effect upon publication in the Official Bulletin on the Republic of
Armenia. 220
218. Id. at 12.
219. Id.
220. ARM. CONST., art. 115. Some provisions of the Constitution will come into
force on a rolling basis. Id. art. 116.
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1. The 1995 Constitution221
A review of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of
Armenia (Constitution or 1995 Constitution) is likely to
engender some cognitive dissonance, in schooled and unschooled
readers alike, due to the conflicting values it appears to
enshrine. The document is divided into nine Chapters.
Chapter 1, The Foundations of Constitutional Order,
outlines, the fundamental principles upon which the Republic is
based. Broadly written, these include "state guarantee[] [of] the
protection of human rights and freedoms,"222 universal
suffrage, 223 a multiparty political system,224 ownership and
protection of private property, 225 "protection and reproduction of
the environment,"226 and, most importantly for purposes of the
analysis here, the principle of "separation of ... powers":227
"State power shall be exercised in accordance with the
Constitution and the laws based on the principle of the
separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers.''228
However, as discussed in this Part, the 1995 Constitution
provided for extremely permeable lines among the three
branches, effectively prescribing the domination of the other
branches by the President of the Republic. 229
Chapter 2, Fundamental Human and Civil Rights and
Freedoms, is a veritable litany of fundamental human rights,
encompassing the traditional Western civil and political rights,
as well as socialist economic, social, and cultural rights. The
rights recognized and to be protected by the state230 are:
equality before the law,2 3 1 privacy in one's dwelling, 232 life, 2 33
221. ARM. CONST. OF 1995; See Defeis, Armenian Constitutional Referendum, supra
note 26, at 277-89 (providing a thorough analysis of the 1995 Constitution).
222. ARM. CONST. OF 1995, art. 4.
223. Id. art. 3.
224. Id. art. 7 (recognizing a multiparty system).
225. Id. art. 8.
226. Id. art. 10.
227. See id. art. 5.
228. ARM. CONST. OF 1995, art. 5. (emphasis added).
229. See id. art. 55.
230. Id. art. 4.
231. Id. art. 16.
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freedom from unwarranted detention 234 or search, 235 and
freedoms of speech, 236 expression, 237 and association. 238 Perhaps
more extraordinary to American eyes are the rights to rest,2 39 an
adequate standard of living and housing,240 and "freedom of
literary, artistic, scientific and technical creation. '241
Indeed, the Constitution's Chapters 1 and 2 present an
almost blinding reflection of human rights norms. The
Constitution is so solicitous of the rights of individuals and the
people, that article 43 provides for the protection of
unenumerated and perhaps still inchoate but universally
accepted human rights: "The rights and freedoms set forth in the
Constitution are not exhaustive and shall not be construed to
exclude other universally accepted human and civil rights and
freedoms." 24
2
The provisions of Chapter 3, The President of the Republic;
Chapter 4, The National Assembly; Chapter 5, The Government;
and Chapter 6, Judicial Power, contradict and undermine the
fundamental principles and rights expressly provided for in the
preceding chapters, thus engendering the cognitive dissonance
diagnosed at the beginning of this section. 243 Chapters 7, 8, and
232. Id. art. 21.
233. Id. art. 17. However, the 1995 Constitution provides for an exception, so the
death penalty may be prescribed as an exceptional punishment for certain capital
crime. Id.
234. ARM. CONST. OF 1995, art. 18.
235. Id. art. 21.
236. Id. art. 24.
237. Id. art. 23.
238. Id. art. 26.
239. Id. art. 30 ("Everyone is entitled to rest.").
240. ARM. CONST. OF 1995, art. 31.
241. Id. art. 36.
242. Id. art. 43.
243. Chapters 3 through 6 enumerate the powers of each branch of government.
See ARM. CONST. chs. 3-6. Because, inter alia, the Legislature's agenda is limited by the
President and the President has the ability to both designate and remove judges, the
balance of powers is weighted heavily in the President's favor. Id. This allows a
president to violate these human rights principles without significant check.
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9 address Territorial Administration and Local Self
Government; Adoption of the Constitution, Amendments; and
Provisions For the Transitional Period, respectively.
244
The separation of powers among the three branches
(Executive, Judiciary, and Legislative) is, in fact, merely
illusory, with broad power concentrated in the President of the
Republic. Professor Elizabeth Defeis notes: "[T]he powers vested
in the President are vast and the office has been characterized
as 'probably the strongest presidency anywhere in the western
world.' 245 Among the powers vested in the President by Chapter
3 of the Constitution are the ability to dissolve the National
Assembly (the Republic's unicameral legislative body) after
consultations with the Prime Minister and President of the
National Assembly;246 appointment and removal of the Prime
Minister and members of the government,247 for example, the
cabinet; appointment, removal, and approval of the arrest of the
members and President of the Constitutional Court 248 and the
judges of all three levels of the tri-level Armenian Judicial
system; 249 and appointment and removal of the Prosecutor
General upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.
250
Vis-&-vis the Legislative branch, the President, and his
government hold perhaps overwhelming power. Chapter 4
delineates the powers of the National Assembly, with Article 62
providing "[t]he powers of the National Assembly are
determined by the Constitution."251 In addition to the absence
from the Constitution of a "necessary and proper" clause or its
equivalent, which could provide room for the expansion of the
National Assembly's power, the President and his government
control the agenda of the National Assembly and, therefore, in
244. See ARM. CONST. OF 1995, chs. 7-9.
245. Defeis, Armenian Constitutional Referendum, supra note 26, at 283 (quoting
from Chrystia Freeland, Armenia Polls Test Fragile Democracy, FIN. TIMES, July 5, 1995,
at 2).
246. ARM. CONST. OF 1995, art. 55(3).
247. Id. art. 55(4).
248. Id. art. 55(10).
249. Id. art. 55(11).
250. Id. art. 55(9).
251. Id. art. 62.
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large part, the Assembly's exercise of its power.252 In Professor
Defeis' words, "The allocated legislative powers are extremely
limited ' 253 and "the Government to a large extent controls the
legislative agenda."254
2. Status of the Judiciary under the 1995 Constitution
As in any study of the existence and functioning of the rule
of law, of particular concern is the status and power of the
Judiciary, and the Judiciary's consequent power to enforce the
rule of law. Judges in Armenia do not enjoy judicial
independence, as separation of the balance of power between
Executive and Judiciary-a separation that is essential to the
checks and balances of power, and indeed, to the rule of law
itself-has not been enshrined in the Constitution.255
The Judicial system in Armenia has three levels: courts of
first instance, with general jurisdiction, review courts, and a
court of appeals, 256 also referred to as the Court of Cassation. 257
A separate Constitutional Court hears constitutional
challenges. 258 Analysis of the 1995 Constitution indicates that
prior to the constitutional amendment in 2005, judges in
Armenia were constrained by the structural realities of their
office, while desire for change was impacted by the realities of
intimidation and violence.259
"The President of the Republic shall be the guarantor of the
independence of the judicial bodies.''260
252. Defeis, Armenian Constitutional Referendum, supra note 26, at 284.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 285.
255. ARM. CONST. OF 1995, art. 55(11)
256. Id. arts. 92, 100.
257. See, e.g., LAW ON THE STATUS OF JUDGES art. 2 (June 17, 1998), available at
http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=1 12&lid=3414.
258 ARM. CONST. OF 1995, art. 100.
259. Perhaps in recognition of the precarious position of the Judiciary and the ease
of targeting them, the Law on the Status of Judges provides that "Judges shall have a
right to have and to wear a service weapon and special means of defense." LAW ON THE
STATUS OF JUDGES, supra note 257, art. 25.
260. ARM. CONST. OF 1995, art. 94 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 29:3
SMOKE, MIRRORS, AND THE JOKER IN THE PACK
"The President of the Republic ... may remove from office
any judge, sanction the arrest of a judge and through the judicial
process, authorize the initiation of administrative or criminal
proceedings against a judge."2 61
The above provisions from the 1995 Armenian Constitution
encapsulate some of the principal flaws concerning the status of
the Armenian Judiciary. The President of the Republic has the
power to appoint, remove, and order the arrest of all members of
Armenia's Judiciary. 262
The appointment of judges, their evaluation, and discipline
are decided and carried out by the Judicial Council. 263 Article 95
of the 1995 Constitution provides:
The Judicial Council:
1) shall, upon the recommendation of the Minister of
Justice, draft and submit for the approval of the
President of the Republic the annual list of judges, in
view of their competence and professional advancement,
which shall be used as the basis for appointments.
2) shall, upon the recommendation of the Prosecutor
General, draft and submit for the approval of the
President of the Republic the annual list of prosecutors,
in view of their competence and professional
advancement, which shall be used as the basis for
appointments.
261. Id. art. 55(11) (emphasis added).
262. Id.
263. Id. art. 94. All members of the Judicial Council were appointed by
the President:
The Council shall include fourteen members appointed by the President of
the Republic for a period of five years, including two legal scholars, nine
judges and three prosecutors. Three Council members shall be appointed
each from among the judges of the courts of first instance, the courts of
review and the courts of appeals. The general assembly of judges shall
submit three candidates by secret ballot for each seat allocated to judges.
The Prosecutor General shall submit the names of candidates for the
prosecutors' seats in the Council.
2007]
HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
3) shall propose candidates for the presidency of the
courts of appeals, the presidency and judgeship positions
of its chambers, the presidency of the courts of review,
courts of first instance and other courts. It shall make
recommendations about the other judicial candidates
proposed by the Ministry of Justice.
4) shall make recommendations regarding the
candidates for Deputy Prosecutor proposed by the
Prosecutor General, and the candidates for prosecutors
heading operational divisions in the Office of the
Prosecutor.
5) shall make recommendations regarding training
programs for judges and prosecutors.
6) shall make recommendations regarding the removal
from office of a judge, the arrest of a judge, and the
initiation of administrative or criminal proceedings
through the judicial process against a judge.
7) shall take disciplinary action against judges. The
president of the court of appeals shall chair the
meetings of the Judicial Council when the Council is
considering disciplinary action against a judge. The
President of the Republic, the Minister of Justice and
the Prosecutor General shall not take part in these
meetings.
8) shall express its opinion on issues of pardons when
requested by the President of the Republic.
The operational procedures of the Judicial Council shall
be prescribed by law.264
Thus, all judges are appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Judicial Council 265-a council over which
the President presides. 266 The Vice Presidents of the Council are
the Prosecutor-General and the Minister of Justice. 267 While
membership of the Judicial Council includes some judges, the
264. Id. art. 95 (emphasis added).
265. Id. art. 95(1).
266. ARM. CONST. OF 1995 art. 94 ('The President of the Republic... shall preside
over the Judicial Council.").
267. Id. "The Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General shall be the vice
presidents of the Council." Id.
[Vol. 29:3
SMOKE, MIRRORS, AND THE JOKER IN THE PACK
appointment of those members is decided by the President, who,
following a non-public interview process chooses among
candidates presented by the members of the Judiciary. 268
These constitutional limitations on the Judiciary's status
and function are further elaborated on in the Law on the Status
of Judges 269 that mandates the independence, 270 immunity, 271
and irremovable nature272 of the judges' office. Nevertheless, the
law enshrines the subordination of the Judicial branch to the
Executive 273 with respect to the discipline 274 and termination of
judges. 275
While lifetime appointments of all judges and members of
the Constitutional Court, 276 as well as the constitutional
requirement of independence, 277 appear to guarantee the
neutral application of the rule of law and independence of the
Judiciary, the preceding discussion outlines the hollowness of
the provisions, and the disconnect between de facto reality and
de jure adjurations. The provisions function as smoke to obscure
the reality of lack of independence and as mirrors to reflect
outward the desired normative imitation of the West.
268. See id. art. 94.
269. LAW ON THE STATUS OF JUDGES, supra note 257.
270. Id. art. 5 ("During administration of justice judges shall be independent, and
subordinate only to law.").
271. Id. art. 11 ("A judge shall be immune.").
272. Id. art. 10 ("A judge shall be irremovable.").
273. Id. art. 11 ("Only the Procurator [sic] General of the Republic of Armenia may
commence a criminal prosecution against a judge, and the former shall oversee the
legality of the conduct of investigation of that case.").
274. See id. arts. 31-32 (elaborating in detail the disciplinary causes of action and
procedures against members of the judiciary).
275. LAw ON THE STATUS OF JUDGES, supra note 257, art. 30 (listing the grounds
for termination of members of the judiciary).
276. ARM. CONST. OF 1995 art. 96 ("Judges and members of the Constitutional
court are appointed for life. A judge may hold office until the age of 65, while a member
of the Constitutional Court may do so until the age of 70.").
277. Id. art. 97 ("When administering justice, judges and members of the
Constitutional Court shall be independent and may only be subject to the law.").
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3. The Judiciary and the 2003 Presidential Elections
This allocation of power greatly affected the functioning of
the rule of law in Armenia during the crucible of elections: The
status of judges, as delineated by the 1995 Armenian
Constitution, prevented the attainment of independence by the
Judiciary and contributed to the serious dereliction of duty on
the part of the Judiciary between the first and second rounds of
the 2003 presidential elections.
The Armenian public widely perceives judges as corrupt
state actors. 278 It is within this context that international
organizations determined special training for the Armenian
Judiciary was necessary in preparation for the presidential
election, especially in light of the amendments to the election
laws. The training appears to have been largely in vain: As
described in Part II, the presidential election, featuring nine
presidential candidates, was decided by a runoff vote after the
incumbent President, Robert Kocharian, failed to win an
absolute majority in the first round.279 The period from the
second round of elections until the conclusion of the
parliamentary elections was marked by civic and social unrest,
manifesting the anger of the Armenian people at the "theft" of
the elections by the incumbent President. 280
The actions of the Judiciary in reaction to these events
evidenced the serious deficits in the balance of power between
278. In a 2002 survey by Transparency International Armenia, respondents
categorized the judiciary as one of the most corrupt groups, somewhat less corrupt than
traffic policemen. CENTER FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
ARMENIA, COUNTRY CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT: PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 13 tbl.1 (2002)
[hereinafter TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL SURVEY]. The survey results must be
viewed in the context of the practice of traffic officers who, from the Author's personal
observations and experiences, regularly flag down motorists in the absence of traffic
violations, then allow them to depart without a ticket in return for a specified number of
drams. It is said each officer must collect a specified amount of drams each day, a
percentage of which is tendered to superior officers. The money then goes up the ladder
into the highest echelons of law enforcement. See infra Part VI.
279. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
280. Anna Hakobyan, Armenia: Yes or No, Mr. President, TRANSITIONS ONLINE,
June 3, 2003, available at 2003 WL 57575.
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the Executive and Judicial branches and the challenges facing
Armenia in its path toward the implementation of meaningful
rule of law reform. Judges presided over secret trials of
opposition campaigners who, after being denied (or, according to
official reports, "refusing") access to counsel were sentenced to
from fifteen days up to a month in prison based on allegations of
public misconduct and hooliganism. 281
4. Procedural Constraints and Challenges of Interpretation
Some flaws in the performance of the Armenian courts stem
from procedural rules that constrain the courts' ability to act.
For example, access to-in other words, standing before-the
Constitutional Court is denied to the individual Armenian
citizen. It is instead restricted to the President of the Republic, a
one third vote of the National Assembly, or candidates who
challenge election proceedings. 282 In addition, due to procedural
flaws in the election laws and the statute of the Constitutional
Court, the Court's decision with respect to the challenges
against the administration's actions during the first and second
rounds of the presidential elections, was not issued until after
the second round had been held 283 and the winner declared. 284
Further, in its decision, the Court acknowledged the
irregularities alleged by the challengers but decided to uphold
the results of the election. 285
281. 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 10; see also Police
Arrest, supra note 182.
282. ARM CONST. OF 1995 art. 101. ('The Constitutional Court may hear cases
submitted by: 1) the President of the Republic; 2) at least one third of the Deputies; 3)
Presidential and parliamentary candidates on disputes concerning election
results .... ).
283. See Const. Court of the Rep. of Arm., In re The Elections for RA President,
Apr. 16, 2003, DCC-412, 1 1, available at http://www.concourt.am/Voroshumsdv-412-
e.htm.
284. Id. 2-3. Stepan Demirchian, the losing candidate, filed suit on March 17,
however, the decision of the Constitutional Court was issued on April 16, 2003, at which
time the incumbent had already been re-invested with the power of the Presidency. Id.
285. Id. 17.
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Considering the factual difference in votes for
Presidential candidates as per the March 5, 2003
election result, the impact thereon of the size of
discrepancies and the results recognized unreliable by
the Court as a result of investigation of the case; as well
as evaluating the analytical material available in the
case; and the impact of duly legally formulated and
evidentially justified electoral violations of a qualitative
nature on realization of active and passive electoral
rights, to keep unchanged the RA CEC Decision 36-A
dated March 11, 2003 on electing a President of the
PA.286
The Constitutional Court, noting that the alleged violations
and subsequent events continued to leach the public's confidence
in the legitimacy of the government, urged the conduct of a
national referendum of confidence. 287
[C]onsidering that on the level of constitutional
solutions, for institutions of representative democracy,
not only the legality of their formation is important, but
also important is the large continuous confidence of
society in that process and a body of state power;
stating the fact that in the circumstances of the yet
imperfect constitutional democracy, the election
dispute, which is of crucial importance for the destiny of
the state, also has a deep socio-political context based
on lack of confidence and intolerance;
giving high importance to referenda and plebiscites as a
special significant form of immediate democracy and
realization of people's power, and of resolving issues of
special importance for the state and establishing social
confidence and people's consent;
to suggest to the newly elected RA National Assembly
and the RA President, within one year, in the
consonance to democracy and rule of law to bring the
RA Law 'On Referendum' in compliance with the
requirements of the first part of unchangeable Article 2
286. Id. 17(5) (emphasis added).
287. Id. 17(6).
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of the RA Constitution and to select the organization of
a referendum of confidence as an effective measure to
overcome social resistance deepened during the
presidential elections. 288
The court thus appears to acknowledge implicitly, that even in
the face of a finding that violations were committed, it has no
power under the Constitution or electoral law to hand out or
impose sanctions to cure the violations. Given that the
Constitution does not provide for the administration of a
referendum of confidence to legitimate electoral results, it is not
surprising that the government questioned the legitimacy of this
suggestion from the Court.289
The Constitutional Court's call for a referendum of
confidence transports the observer into Samuel Beckett's theatre
of the absurd. While affirming that violations did take place,
and deciding that those violations did not have a material effect
on the results of the elections, yet recognizing that their decision
would not have validity in the eyes of the citizenry, the Judicial
body, implicitly acknowledging its own impotence and lack of
authority, suggests a potentially legitimizing mechanism that is
illegal under Armenian law. More significantly, the
Constitutional Court's suggestion evidenced a belief by the
judges that the machinery of democracy in the Republic of
Armenia failed with respect to the 2003 presidential elections.
The Court's opinion is illustrative of Professor Frank
Emmert's description of the methodological challenges to legal
reform among the then-candidate countries to the European
Union (E.U.):
288. Id. Article 2 of the 1995 Constitution, to which the Constitutional Court made
specific reference, provides "[i]n the Republic of Armenia power lies with the people. The
people exercise their power through free elections and referenda, as well as through
state and local self-governing bodies and public officials as provided by the Constitution.
The usurpation of power by any organization or individual constitutes a crime." ARM.
CONST. OF 1995 art. 2 (emphasis added).
289. Armenian President Rejects Call for 'Referendum of Confidence,' RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Apr. 18, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/04/
180403.asp?po=y; Armenian Prosecutor-General's Office Queries Constitutional Court
Ruling, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIo LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Apr. 18, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/
newsline/2003/04/180403.asp?po=y.
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[Methodological problems ... are widespread in
Central and Eastern Europe. First of all, the judges are
trained to apply the law and the (written) law only.
They have no training to overcome lacunae in the law,
for example, by recourse to general principles of law,
such as the notion of unjust enrichment. Second, the
judges have no experience with the concept of justice in
contrast to the concept of law. This can lead to cases
where the letter of the law is duly followed but the
result is obviously unjust, if not outright absurd.290
The conduct of the Judiciary in the period between the first and
second rounds of the elections, and the inability of the
Constitutional Court to provide a timely or real remedy in the
face of documented violations, depicts the true status of the
Judiciary and the structural flaws of that status. These flaws,
however, have been obfuscated by the smokescreen of the
highflown enunciations of the Law on the Status of Judges 291
and the guarantees of independence constitutionally provided by
the President.292
C. The 2005 Constitution - Theatrical Non-Reform Reform?
The process of amendment of the 1995 Constitution also
demonstrates flaws in Armenia's transition to democracy and
the rule of law.
1. Purposes of the Amendment
As a condition of its accession to the Council of Europe, the
Republic made commitments to conduct reforms of its legal
system.293 Pursuant to those commitments, Armenia obligated
itself to, among other things, sign and ratify international
treaties and reform its domestic law to comply with those
treaties, including amendments to its 1995 Constitution.294 For
290. Emmert, supra note 187, at 295.
291. See generally LAW ON THE STATUS OF JUDGES, supra note 257.
292. ARM. CONST. OF 1995, art. 94.
293. EUR. PARL. ASS., Armenia's Application for Membership of the Council of
Europe, Opinion No. 221, 13, 21st Sess. Doc. No. 8747 (2000), available at
http://www.coe.am/en/docs/pace/opinion_221.pdf [hereinafter EUR. PARL. ASS., No. 221].
294. Id.
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example, the structure of the courts and appointment and
removal of judges is addressed in the 1995 Constitution.295 The
commitments included the requirement that Armenia "fully
implement the reform of the judicial system, in order to
guarantee, inter alia: the full independence of the
judiciary ... .,,296 Since the balance of power among the branches
of government was specified in the Constitution, only a reform of
the relevant constitutional provisions could affect such a change.
The principal areas identified for reform were recognition
and protection of human rights, local self-government, and the
balance of power among the Executive, Judiciary, and
Legislature. 297  The process of constitutional reform was
supported by the Venice Commission 298 and other international
organizations that assisted in the drafting and evaluations of
proposed provisions.
2. Process of Amendment
In 2002, the government of Armenia announced a halt in the
process of constitutional reform.299 Then, unexpectedly, some
weeks prior to the National Assembly elections of 2003, the
government announced that the referendum on the Constitution
would take place simultaneously with the National Assembly
elections.300 The draft submitted for referendum did not reflect
the comments of the Venice Commission, but instead
295. ARM. CONST. OF 1995, arts. 91-103.
296. EUR. PARL. ASS., No. 221, supra note 293.
297. Venice Commission, Council of Europe, Interim Opinion on Constitutional
Reforms in the Republic of Armenia, Opinion No. 313/2004, CDL-AD (2004)044, 5
(2004), http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2004/CDL-AD(2004)044-e.asp [hereinafter Venice
Commission, Interim Opinion].
298. Id. 8.
299. Liz Fuller, Opposition Postpones Vote on Alternative Armenian Draft
Constitution, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Apr. 4, 2002, http://www.rferl.
org/newsline/2002/04/2-TCAltca-040402.asp?po=y.
300. Press Release, Embassy of the Republic of Armenia, Parliamentary Elections,
Referendum to be Held on May 25, 2003 (May 14, 2003) http://www.armeniaemb.org/
News/EmbassyPressReleases/Releases/ParliamentElections2003.htm; Liz Fuller,
Armenian Parliament Approves Proposed Constitutional Amendments, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Apr. 3, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/
04/030403.asp#2-tca.
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inexplicably was a reversion to an earlier draft.30 1  The
referendum did not pass, failing to receive the minimum vote
required by the Constitution. 30 2
Efforts to present another referendum to the Armenian
voters began in January 2004. 30 3 Three competing proposals
were presented to the National Assembly, 30 4 which accepted the
proposal of the ruling coalition. 30 5 The Venice Commission of the
Council of Europe issued successive opinions on three iterations
of the amendment. 30 6
President Kocharian signed the order to hold the
referendum on October 4, 2005, with the vote scheduled for
November 27, 2005. News reports 30 7 and the 2005 Needs
301. Venice Commission, Interim Opinion, supra note 297, 6; EUR. PARL. Ass.,
Constitutional Reform Process in Armenia, Resolution 1458, 5, 22nd Sess., Doc. 10601
(2005), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/
ta05/ERES1458.htm [hereinafter PACE Resolution 1458] ('This draft, however,
underwent significant changes during its examination and adoption by parliament and
the text submitted to referendum in May 2003 represented an important step backwards.")
(emphasis added).
302. The draft was approved by 46% of the 1.2 million voters who participated in
the vote. Armenian Voters Reject Proposed Constitutional Amendments, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, May 29, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/05/2-
TCA/tca-290503.asp. The 1995 Constitution required 50% of the participating voters,
and no less than one-third of eligible voters, give their approval. ARM. CONST. OF 1995,
art. 113.
303. Venice Commission, Interim Opinion, supra note 297, 8.
304. Id.
305. OSCE/ODIHR, REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA, CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM
27 Nov. 2005, OSCE/ODIHR NEEDS ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT 24-25 OCT. 2005 4
(Nov. 10, 2005), http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2005/11/16947_en.pdf [hereinafter
2005 NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT].
306. Venice Commission, Interim Opinion, supra note 297; Venice Commission,
Council of Europe, Second Interim Opinion on Constitutional Reforms in the Republic of
Armenia, Opinion no. 313/2004, CDL-AD(2005)016 (2005), http://www.venice.coe.int/
docs/2005/CDL-AD(2005)016-e.asp; Venice Commission, Council of Europe, Final
Opinion on Constitutional Reforms in the Republic of Armenia, Opinion no. 313/2004,
CDL-AD(2005)025 (2005), http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2005/CDL-AD(2005)025-e.asp
[hereinafter Venice Commission, Final Opinion].
307. See generally 2005 NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 305 (describing
news reports on the political context, constitutional amendments, legal framework,
election administration, voter lists, media, and domestic observers).
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Assessment Report of the OSCE/ODIHR revealed deep flaws in
the process, including lack of access to the media for opponents
of the referendum, 308 potentially inaccurate or fraudulent voter
lists,30 9  and violence perpetrated against participants in
demonstrations against the referendum. 310 Although opposed to
the proposal, the opposition parties failed to work cohesively or
devise a viable plan of opposition. A campaign encouraging
voters to vote "no" on the referendum was changed midstream to
a campaign for voter boycott. 311 Some opposition figures
disagreed, alleging that a boycott would give electoral officials a
greater opportunity for fraud.312
The Republic declined to request observation by the
OSCE/ODIHR 313  of the conduct of the referendum.
Consequently, no OSCE/ODIHR observation mission was
constituted nor was an OSCE/ODIHR election observation
report issued on the referendum. However, contemporaneous
press reports and opposition allegations center on discrepancies
between voting activity and the number of "yes" votes reported
by officials. 314 The Council of Europe, the E.U., and the
308. Id. at 8.
309. Id. at 7.
310. Liz Fuller, Armenian Police Detain 'Dozens' of Opposition Activists, RADIO
FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Dec. 6, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/
2005/12/2-TCA/tca-061205.asp.
311. Liz Fuller, Armenia: Both Sides Gear Up for Constitutional Referendum,
RADIO FREE EUR.[RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Nov. 21, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/
featuresarticle/2005/11/436ab37d-54eb-47f6-b34e-e2afOd3l503e.html.
312. 2005 NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 305, at 3.
313. Richard Giragosian, See U.S. Calls on Armenia to Address Reported
Referendum Fraud, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Dec. 1, 2005,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2OO5/12/011205.asp#2-tca. The 2005 Needs Assessment
Report makes clear the OSCE/ODIHR's readiness to commit resources to an election
observation mission for the referendum. See 2005 NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra
note 305, at 8-9.
314. See, e.g., Liz Fuller, Armenian Opposition Decries 'Unprecedented'Referendum
Fraud..., RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Nov. 29, 2005, http://www.rferl.
org/newsline/2005/11/291105.asp#2-tca.
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government of the United States have questioned the accuracy
of the reported "yes" vote. 315 Demonstrations arose following the
announcement that the referendum had passed, 316 continuing a
seemingly inevitable feature of the Armenian political scene
whenever the people are asked to exercise their quintessential
democratic power-the right to vote.
3. Implications for the Future
Whatever may be the advantages or beneficial aspects of the
new Constitution, the conduct of the plebiscite, as well as official
reaction thereafter, 3 17 reveal contempt for the rule of law and a
thinly masked trend toward authoritarianism. The exclusion
from the drafting process of opposing viewpoints, including the
opposition parties, problems with voter lists, violence directed
against and intimidation of opposition figures and supporters,
and limited media access all reveal a power structure that
operates on its own terms, with little room for the input of
others.
The question then arises-why bother to go through the
motions of reform, if resources will then be dedicated to limiting
the effects of those reforms? Theatrical non-reform reforms
operate as the smoke and mirrors that hide the true nature of
the regime, and act as carrots to stimulate continued Western
aid and engagement, while giving the regime cover to continue
its consolidation of power.
315. See id. (reporting that "the Council of Europe's election monitoring group also
observed the discrepancy between the modest number of people who were witnessed
voting and turnout figures which they suggested were 'overstated in a significant
number of polling stations"); Liz Fuller, EU Registers Concern Over Conduct of
Armenian Referendum, RADIO FREE EuR./RADIo LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Dec. 6, 2005,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/12/061205.asp#2-tca; Richard Giragosian, U.S. Calls
on Armenia to Address Reported Referendum Fraud, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY
NEWSLINE, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/12/011205.asp#2-tca.
316. See Liz Fuller, Thousands Join Armenian Referendum Protest, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADio LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Nov. 30, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/
2005/11/301105.asp#2-tca.
317. Liz Fuller.... As Officials Downplay Violations, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO
LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Nov. 29, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/11/291105.
asp#2-tca. (responding to accusations of fraud, a deputy parliamentary speaker noted
that "it is impossible to hold a perfect vote" in Armenia).
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The 2005 Constitution of the Republic of Armenia addresses
a majority of the structural balance of power issues of the 1995
Constitution discussed earlier in this Part. After three rounds of
comments, 318 the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe
substantially approved the third version of the proposed
amendment in the form that emerged from the third reading in
the National Assembly.319
Principal changes included curtailment of the President's
power to dissolve the National Assembly 320 and limitations on
the President's power to appoint the Prosecutor-General and
remove deputies of the Prosecutor-General. 321 Most importantly
for the purpose of judicial independence, among other things,
the 2005 Constitution increased the input of the Armenian
Judiciary and National Assembly in the composition of the
successor to the Judicial Council, 322 and, for the first time,
created individual access to the Constitutional Court.323 Also
symbolically important, "the Constitution and laws"'3 24 replaced
the President as guarantors of the independence of Armenia's
318. See supra notes 301-05 and accompanying text.
319. Proposed legislation is "read" in the National Assembly-the process by which
legislation is debated, amended, and adopted. See RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, art. 77(1) (2002) (Arm.), available at http://www.parliament.am/
parliament.php?id=bylaw&lang-eng#10.
320. See ARM. CONST. arts. 55(3), 74(1).
321. See id. art. 55(9).
322. Compare ARM. CONST. art. 94.1 ("The Council of Justice shall consist of up to
nine judges elected by secret ballot for a period of five years by the General Assembly of
Judges of the Republic of Armenia .. ") with ARM. CONST. OF 1995 art. 94 ("The
[Judicial] Council shall include fourteen members appointed by the President of the
Republic....").
323. Compare ARM. CONST. art. 101 ("[T]he application to the Constitutional Court
may be filed by... every person in a specific case when the final judicial act has been
adopted .... ) with ARM. CONST. OF 1995, art. 101 (providing that the Constitutional
Court may only hear cases from the President, deputies, presidential and parliamentary
candidates and the government).
324. See ARM. CONST. art. 94.
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courts. 32 5 Importantly (and controversially), the Constitution
provides an avenue to citizenship for nonresident Diaspora
Armenians and, almost certainly, a concomitant right to vote. 3 26
These and other changes appear to bring Armenia's
constitutional framework into closer congruence with European
standards. 327 However, the non-inclusive and heavy-handed
process of amending the Constitution, together with allegations
of fraud surrounding the November 27, 2005 referendum,
undermine the image of progress in rule of law reform. Despite
the exhortations of the Venice Commission 328 and of PACE, 329
the Armenian authorities appear to have pursued the now
familiar unilateralist approach of ignoring input that comes
from outside the administration.
325. Compare ARM. CONST. art. 94 ('The independence of courts shall be
guaranteed by the Constitution and laws.") with ARM. CONST. OF 1995, art. 94 ('The
President... shall be the guarantor of the independence of the judicial bodies.").
326. See ARM. CONST. art. 11.3 ("Armenians by birth shall acquire citizenship of
the Republic of Armenia through a simplified procedure."); id. art. 30 ("Eighteen year old
citizens of the Republic of Armenia have the right to take part in the elections and
referendums .... The rights and obligations of persons having dual citizenship shall be
defined by law.").
327. See, e.g., Venice Commission, Final Opinion, supra note 306, 40.
328. See id. 41 ("It is certainly important that the discussions of the final text be
pursued in an open and transparent manner with the opposition forces and civil society
in Armenia. The broadest political consensus must be found.").
329. PACE Resolution 1458 on the constitutional reform process in Armenia
provides, at paragraph 13:
The Assembly therefore calls on the Armenian authorities and the
parliamentary majority to:
ii. undertake clear and meaningful steps in order to resume an immediate
dialogue with the opposition;
iii. adopt the text at second reading without altering the agreement reached
with the Venice Commission on the above-mentioned points and no later
than August 2005;
iv. provide live broadcasting of the parliamentary sittings where the
constitutional amendments will be discussed and voted;
v. start a well-prepared and professional awareness-raising campaign
immediately after the adoption of the text at the second reading;
vi. implement without delay the Assembly recommendations with regard to
media pluralism in order to guarantee the broadest possible public debate;
vii. urgently update voters' lists[.]
PACE RESOLUTION 1458, supra note 301, 13.
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Indeed, based on previous conduct of the Armenian
authorities, it is logical to question the manner in which the
2005 Constitution will function following its coming into effect.
This is an administration accustomed to undermining the rule of
law, while appearing and claiming to adhere to it. Whether the
2005 Constitution is but another theatrical non-reform reform,
another smokescreen and mirror held up to the gaze of the
international community, remains to be "seen."
VI. THE JOKER IN THE PACK?
The joker is the trump card in the pack; it throws the other
players and perhaps wins the game.330 But what is the game? Is
it the process of transition to democracy and the rule of law? Or
is the evolution of transitional countries in Central Asia and the
Caucasus merely a sideshow of the "Great Game"33 1 that
continues to be played in that region of the world? In the new
Great Game, 332 might the prospect of the success of such a
transition be the joker in the pack?
The joker could be an active sentient agent that manipulates
the smoke and mirrors of apparent reform for his or her own
benefit. Or it could be a nonsentient force or background reality
that undercuts efforts toward reform. In the context of the
smoke and mirrors of Armenian post-Soviet political reform,
who or what is the joker?333
330. See BENHAM, supra note 4.
331. The term the "Great Game" was coined to describe the nineteenth century
struggle for dominance in Central Asia and the Caucasus by Russia and the British
Empire. See, e.g., PETER HOPKIRK, THE GREAT GAME: THE STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE IN
CENTRAL ASIA 2-6 (1992) (describing the stimulus for, and broad parameters of, the
Great Game).
332. See id. at xv. Hopkirk hypothesizes that a new Great Game is now being
played in the region as a result of the termination of Soviet dominance. Id. Russia, the
United States, and China are now the powerful actors seeking to protect and further
their interests through engagement in the region. Id. at xv-xviii. See, e.g., Guy Chazan,
Russia Reasserting Itself in Mideast, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2005, at A6 (suggesting the
sweeping play of the New Great Game); Emil Danielyan, Caucasus: Russia Boosts
Alliance With Armenia As U.S. Gains Foothold in Georgia, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO
LIBERTY NEWSLINE, June 6, 2002, http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/06/06062
002162402.asp [hereinafter Danielyan, Caucasus: Russia Boosts Alliance].
333. The Author poses this question and attempts to answer it in this Part of the
Article with full realization that the very illusion-making mechanisms identified
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A. Endogenous Suspects
1. Geo-Political Realities
Is it possible that Armenia's geographic and geopolitical
location condemns it to instability and stillborn reform? The
Republic is a Christian island (together with the Republic of
Georgia) surrounded by a sea of Muslim countries, in a region
that is a crossroads of three storied empires. 334 The Russian,
Ottoman, and Persian Empires are long gone, yet the tensions
live on or have found new manifestations among their political
descendants. Iran, Persia's modern incarnation, threatens the
world's security with nuclear dreams. 335 Ongoing tensions with
Turkey, direct successor to the Ottoman Empire, stemming from
the unresolved issue of the 1915 Armenian Genocide, 336 mean
that the Turkey-Armenia border is closed.337 Russia, heir, via
the U.S.S.R., to the Russian Empire, is Armenia's friend, but a
friend that holds the upper hand. 338
The potential instability of the South Caucasus region also
includes the ceasefire brokered by the Council of Europe
between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Little
elsewhere in this Article make this a potentially futile task. See discussion supra Parts
IV. & V. The Author is, in effect, "looking through a glass darkly," but points to some
likely suspects that may fill the role.
334. See BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at 211-15.
335. See Western Powers Seek UN Council Pressure on Iran, THE EPOCH TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2006, available at http://en.epochtimes.com/news/6-3-15/39323.html; Nazila
Fathi, Iran is Defiant, Vowing to U.N. It Will Continue Nuclear Efforts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2006 at A14.
336. Editorial, Turkey, Armenia and Denial, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2006, at A24.
337. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
338. In the 1997 Russian-Armenian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance between Armenia and the Russian Federation, Russia agreed to provide the
troops that guard Armenia's closed border with Turkey. Armenia Signs Military Alliance
with Russia, 3 FORTNIGHT REV., Sept. 12, 1997, available at http://www.jamestown.orgl
publication details.php?volumeid=4&&issueid-217. In addition, in 2002 through
2003, in repayment for outstanding debts from the Soviet-era, Russia "demanded and
received" the Medsamor nuclear plant, a primary source of Armenia's energy supplies, as
well as other industrial assets. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 289-90. Russia,
therefore, has control of a crucial piece of Armenia's economy. See id. at 292 ("With
Russian control of Armenia's energy sector, major industrial concerns, and supply of
arms, Russia can now take Armenia for granted.").
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progress has been made in finding a lasting resolution,339 which
means Armenia is located in a region with the potential to flare
into deadly conflict.
This potential instability, in addition to the financial and
energy resource opportunities presented by Azerbaijan's oil and
gas, keeps the world's focus on the region. It may explain the
active engagement in the Transcaucasus of the world's sole
current superpower, the United States, and the continued
interest of the successor of that superpower's erstwhile Cold
War competitor-the Russian Federation. 340
2. Resistance to Change - Inertia
Perhaps, instead, the joker in the pack is the resistance to
change in times of uncertainty. It is possible that awareness of
the potential instability of Armenia's geopolitical location
creates a psychological resistance to change. That awareness
may make the prospect of true democracy appear to be a
dangerous possibility that might harm Armenia's long-term
interests. Such resistance is even more pronounced in a nation
at war,341 among the average citizens, the political elites, and
the military.
3. Corruption and Clientelism
Another key suspect is the corruption of public officials and
the primacy of clientelist networks in the economic, political,
and social spheres of the Republic. Corruption, including bribe
339. See, e.g., Katrin Bennhold, Armenia and Azerbaijan Remain Stalled in Talks,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at A4 ("During two days of talks, President Robert Kocharian
of Armenia and his Azeri counterpart, liham Aliyev, came no closer to resolving their
differences over the future status of the enclave, according to a joint statement issued by
French, Armenian and Russian mediators.").
340. See, e.g., Danielyan, Caucasus: Russia Boosts Alliance supra note 332
(describing the jockeying for power in the Caucasus by the Russian Federation and the
United States).
341. Despite the ceasefire, so long as there is no resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabagh conflict, Armenia and Azerbaijan are nations at war. See LIBARIDIAN, supra
note 29, at 260-64. See C.J. Chivers, Sun and Surf, but Also Lines in the 'Russian' Sand,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006 at A12 (describing the Armenia-Azerbaijan stalemate over
Nagorno-Karabakh as one of four "frozen conflicts" that arose with and remain
unresolved since the breakup of the Soviet Union).
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seeking and receiving by judges and police officers, undermines
both democracy and the rule of law as it negates one of the rule
of law's central tenets-the neutral and equal applicability of
the law to all who are subject to its power.
a. The Judiciary
In Armenia, the Judiciary is perceived to be "on sale." The
ABA/CEELI Judicial Reform Index for Armenia of April 2002,342
based on the survey of a cross-section of "judges, lawyers,
journalists and outside observers with detailed knowledge of the
judicial system,"343 notes "[b]ribery... is a common problem,
caused, many respondents say, by low judicial salaries, mistrust
of the Judicial system and historical practice. One respondent
lawyer reported cases are often stalled by judges who are
waiting for a sufficient bribe to be proposed."'344  Some
respondents theorized that the consequences of such corruption
were less deleterious to the rule of law than may be superficially
apparent: "Many respondents did claim, however, that just
because a bribe is transferred does not mean an illegal decision
was made, implying that the judge evaluates the case, and then
solicits a bribe from the party he thinks, by law, should win."
345
In the 2002 Transparency International Country Corruption
Assessment, a survey of public officials in Armenia revealed, in
342. ABA/CEELI has published a series of Judicial Reform Indexes covering
various transitional countries in which ABA/CEELI operates. American Bar Association,
Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, The Judicial Reform Index: Overview,
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/publications/jrijri-overview.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
The purpose of the Judicial Reform Index "is to assess a cross-section of factors
important to judicial reform in emerging democracies." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN LAW INITIATIVE, JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR
ARMENIA i (Apr. 2002), http://unpanl.un.org/intradocrgroups/public/documentsUNTC/
UNPAN017579.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR ARMENIA].
343. Id. at iii.
344. Id. at 32.
345. Id. at 32. If true, in effect, members of the Judiciary require the winning
litigant to provide the Judiciary support that the public coffers cannot or will not
provide. It is unclear whether support is shared among the participants in the system
(such as court officers and security guards) or whether each functionary connected to the
judicial system is responsible for obtaining his or her own contribution from litigants.
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their opinion, "the first three extremely corrupt institutions in
Armenia are courts, -the Prosecutor's Office and Yerevan City
Hall. '346 The depths of the cynicism of the Armenian populace
are made clear by a 2005 survey conducted by the Armenian
office of Transparency International. In response to a
contemporaneous anti-corruption drive by the Republic, "less
than 10% of Armenians expressed faith in the government's
campaign to combat corruption .... ,,347
b. Unequal Application of the Law
Corruption undermines the rule of law by allowing officials
in the legal system (the courts, law enforcement officials, and
the prosecutors) to prioritize their personal interests (obtaining
monetary bribes or gathering influence) above the function of
their offices. In addition, the influence created by bribe-taking or
other illicit exercises of power undermines the equal application
of law, a fundamental characteristic of the rule of law. For
example, in the Judicial Reform Index for Armenia, respondents
indicated that the influence of the Executive was felt in the
Judiciary's decision-making: "[O]ne lawyer respondent described
'perceived potential government interests' as another factor
influencing judicial decisions.... One lawyer stated that an
appellate judge told him directly that he could not resist the
opposing pressure to decide a certain way for fear of jeopardizing
his professional future. '348
The unequal application of the law was displayed in legal
proceedings that took place before the presidential elections of
March 2003. The Armenian media reported the case of a
presidential (and later General Assembly) candidate and the
conflicting interpretations of his eligibility to run for President
and General Assembly office.
346. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 278, at 30.
347. Richard Giragosian, Armenian Government's Commitment to Fighting
Corruption Questioned, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Dec. 1, 2005,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/12/011205.asp#2-tca.
348. JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR ARMENIA, supra note 342, at 32. The strength of
the pressure exerted by the Executive on members of the Judiciary is facilitated and
enhanced by the factors discussed supra in Part V.B.2.
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One presidential candidate who lost and decided to run
for Parliament was not allowed to do so because he did
not meet the residency requirement. How he could have
met the requirement two months earlier in the
presidential contest was unclear to the media as well,
who hounded the Central Electoral Commission
without receiving an answer.349
Pursuant to Armenia's Electoral Code, in addition to having
attained at least thirty-five years of age, presidential candidates
must have been citizens and permanent residents of the
Republic for the preceding ten years.350 Candidates for the
General Assembly, in addition to attaining twenty-five years of
age, must have been citizens and permanent residents of the
Republic for the preceding five years. 351 Based on the statute, it
would appear to be impossible for a candidate to satisfy the
eligibility requirements for presidential candidature but not
those for the General Assembly.
In contrast, although repeated questions and court
challenges have been raised about President Kocharian's
eligibility to run for the Armenian presidency, as a native of
Nagorno-Karabagh, he twice was qualified to run for
presidential office in the Republic, and challenges to his
eligibility were summarily dismissed by the courts in 1998352
and again in 2003. 35 3 The questions and challenges stemmed
from Nagorno-Karabagh's Soviet-era status as a part of the
Republic of Azerbaijan. If Kocharian was born in, and was a
citizen of, Azerbaijan who was not naturalized as an Armenian
citizen, he would not have satisfied the constitutional
requirements of citizenship and residence in Armenia.
349. See Elections Recapped, supra note 211, at 44.
350 ELECTORAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARM. art. 65.
351. Id. art. 97.
352. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 250.
353. 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 15; Liz Fuller,
Armenian Court Rules Incumbent Eligible to Contest Presidential Election, RADIO FREE
EuR./RADIo LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Feb. 14, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/
02/140203.asp#2-tca.
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c. Popular Loss of Confidence
Among the deleterious effects of corruption is the lack of
confidence engendered in the citizenry. That lack of confidence
leads to general disregard of the rule of law by the average
person. A former chairman of the anticorruption commission of
the Georgian Parliament is reported to have explained the
effects of corruption as follows:
Corruption is a way of life. People don't believe that the
state will ever provide services or enforce the law, so
they don't pay taxes. There are only two ways to survive
here. To become financially strong yourself, or to place
yourself under the protection of someone who is
stronger. But there is no way to be a citizen; there is
only a kind of feudalism, in politics, government and
business.354
The effects of the corruption of public officials in the
Republic are intensified by the clientelist patronage networks
that control the conduct of public and private business in
Armenia. 355 Christoph H. Stefes describes the phenomenon of
the sale of the position of police officer. The office is sold for
more than the annual public salary earned from the position;
therefore it is clear the officeholder must take bribes to repay
the money loaned to purchase his position. In addition, the
officer must surrender specified amounts to superior officers,
354. Christoph H. Stefes, Clash of Institutions: Clientelism and Corruption v. Rule
of Law, in THE STATE OF LAW IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 13 (Christopher P.M. Waters ed.,
2005) (citing Anatol Lieven, Georgia: A Failing State?, EURASIA INSIGHT, Jan. 30, 2001,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightlarticles/eavOl3OOl.shtml (quoting David
Usupashvili, former chairman of the anti-corruption commission of the Georgian
Parliament)).
355. See, e.g., id. at 1 (describing the Ter-Petrossian regime's strategy of
government).
The government's basic strategy was to create extensive patron-client
networks. Building on connections they had developed during the war years,
ANM [Armenian National Movement] leaders acquired influence among
substantial groups of industrialists, businessmen, and bureaucrats. By
pledging loyalty to their patrons and involving them in the profit-making of a
business or a government strategy, these individuals were assured survival
in Armenia's uncertain economic and political climate.
Id. (citing Ian Bremmer & Corry Welt, Armenia's New Autocrats, 8 J. DEMOCRACY 77, 83
(1997)).
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who pass a mandatory sum of money further up the chain of
command. The officer must also make sure to secure sufficient
bribes to maintain his own standard of living, which exceeds the
standard he would have been afforded by his official salary. 356
According to Stefes, the clientelist structures and networks
in the republics of the South Caucasus have survived (and even
thrived after) the upheaval caused by the end of the Soviet
system.357 So widespread have the networks become that
ordinary citizens are unable to conduct private or public
business other than through the medium of a network-
membership becomes essential to ensure survival. 358  If
membership in a network is essential for survival, and if
participation in corruption is necessary to get a "fair deal,"
establishment of the rule of law in Armenia faces steep
obstacles. 359
The undermining effect of corruption on the rule of law is
replicated in its effects on democracy. Indirect democracy
requires the exercise of choice by the demos. However, in the
face of endemic corruption, it is rational for an individual
member of the electorate to choose to sell his or her vote in
return for ready cash.360 When the individual realizes her
exercise of the vote will not (no cannot) make a difference, that
her vote will be nullified through corrupt means, the incentive is
created to receive an immediate personal benefit, however small,
356. Stefes, supra note 354, at 11. One memorable afternoon, the Author was a
passenger in a vehicle traveling from Zvartnots International Airport to the city of
Yerevan. In the brief (half hour maximum) trip, the vehicle was stopped by traffic police
officers four times. During each stop a small gratuity changed hands.
357. Id. at 10-11.
358. Several Armenian acquaintances detailed to the Author the impossibility of
starting a small business, for example, before first securing a "roof," that is, a protective
network. An individual who attempted to act outside of or without a roof would be
subject to depredations of protectionist rackets operated by dominant networks. See, e.g.,
Liz Fuller, Armenian Businessmen Arrested After Protesting Extortion, RADIO FREE
EuR./RADIo LIBERTY NEWSLINE, Oct. 14, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/
10/141005.asp#2-tca (reporting the arrest on fraud and 'smuggling charges of business
owners who had declined to pay out extortion bribes to customs officials).
359. See Stefes, supra note 354, at 12. Stefes notes "corruption and clientelism are
formidable obstacles to the establishment of the rule of law." Id.
360. See supra note 202 (describing carousel voting).
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from the performance of a meaningless public act. The
availability of the sealed official ballots utilized by the carousel
networks is evidence that such a situation exists. 361 Only a
powerful network would have access to the ballots, which are in
a closely-guarded chain of custody from the time of printing
until the time of counting.
Corruption and clientelist patronage networks, then, appear
to be a key suspect in the search for the joker in the pack,
perhaps shedding some light on the reasons for the stuttering
transition to democracy and the rule of law in Armenia. While
corruption in Armenia certainly existed prior to transition,362 it
is difficult to determine with exactitude the relationship
between corruption and the halting transition, that is, the
proverbial chicken-and-egg problem. Either the pervasive
corruption gives rise to uneven democratic and rule of law
reform, or uneven rule of law and democratic reform gives rise to
endemic corruption.
4. The Presidency
Other potential suspects for the role of the joker include the
President himself or the constitutionally mandated powers of his
office. Some may wonder whether President Kocharian, the
Armenian political figure who gained most from the confusion
and uncertainty following the 1999 parliamentary
assassinations,3 63 may be the joker in the pack. The stymieing of
the development of the rule of law may lie with the attributes of
the office of the Armenian Presidency: The power conferred to
the office of the President by the Constitution and background
maneuvering by the current officeholder also may have
contributed to the halting substantive rule of law reform and
lack of progress toward real democracy.
361. See Armenia: Election Marred, supra note 157.
362. See, e.g., Stefes, supra note 354, at 13.
363. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 253 (describing the political consequences of
the assassinations, which removed President Kocharian's two principal political rivals).
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For the rule of law to develop and flourish, the substantive
content of the legal framework must facilitate contributions
from many points of the political spectrum. The 1999
assassinations of the opposition parliamentary leaders may have
dealt a potentially mortal blow to the development of democracy
and the rule of law in Armenia. The confused and conflicting
response of the Armenian opposition to the proposed
constitutional reforms in 2005,364 for example, demonstrate the
weakness and inability to speak on the part of politicians
outside the administration.
As discussed in Part V, the balance of power in the 1995
Constitution overwhelmingly favored the Executive branch over
the other two branches of government. This characteristic of the
Armenian political and legal framework stifled the inclusion of
substantive content in the laws that serve to protect essential
features of democracy and the rule of law. It also silenced
interpretations of the law that would uphold the fundamental
characteristic of equal and neutral applicability of the law to all.
In order for the demos to fulfill the role of watchdog in a
democracy, the opposition and others who hold different
viewpoints among the populace must have the ability to speak
and influence decision-making. The domination of the
Legislative and Judicial branches by the Executive, and the
political advantages accruing to the incumbent following the
1999 assassinations have stifled those other voices.
B. Exogenous Suspects
1. Nationalism/the Genocide/the Diaspora
Other potential jokers in the pack are the 1915 Armenian
Genocide and Armenian nationalism. The 1915 Genocide of the
Armenian people scattered the survivors throughout the
world.365 The Diaspora continues to be interested in and
committed to Armenia, the acknowledgement of, and reparation
for the Genocide, and the furthering of the Republic's
364. See discussion supra Part V.C.
365. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 138-39.
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prospects. 366 Furthermore, the Diaspora in the United States
has worked to gather political influence that can be deployed for
the perceived benefit of Armenia. 367 Could that power, that
interest, be a joker in the pack, serving to undercut real impetus
toward reform in the Republic?
The following two examples of the exercise of power by the
Armenian Diaspora in the United States are telling.
a. The FREEDOM Support Act
The 1992 FREEDOM (Freedom for Russian and Emerging
Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets) Support Act included
Section 907 that provided:
United States assistance under this or any other Act
(other than assistance under title V of this Act) may not
be provided to the Government of Azerbaijan until the
President determines, and so reports to the Congress,
that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking
demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other
offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-
Karabagh. 368
This provision was introduced by Senator John Kerry in the
aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and was
supported by many Congressional members of the influential
Armenian Caucus. 369 Section 907 prevented the United States
from providing reform assistance to the Republic of Azerbaijan
that might otherwise have been analogous in scope to the
assistance offered to the other former Soviet Republics. 370 The
366. Id. at 297-98.
367. BOURNOUTIAN, supra note 25, at 353-55.
368. Freedom Support Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-511, § 907 (1992) (noted as
Assistance to Azerbaijan in 22 U.S.C. § 5812 (2000)).
369. The membership of the Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues comes from
both houses of Congress and represents both the Democratic and Republican parties.
Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues, Members of the Caucus,
http://www.house.gov/pallone/armenia-list.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2007) (listing the
member of the caucus). The caucus represents widely-dispersed districts and exceeds 140
members. Id.
370. Compare 22 U.S.C. § 5402 (2000) (authorizing the President to provide
support to former Soviet Republics) with Freedom Support Act of 1992 § 907 (noted as
assistance to Azerbaijan in 22 U.S.C. § 5812).
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provision also appeared to demand a unilateral lifting of the
blockade by Azerbaijan, but it imposed no corresponding
pressure on Armenia to work toward a resolution of the
Karabagh dispute that might facilitate removal of the
blockade. 371 The provision thus represents unequivocal United
States support for Armenia in the complicated Nagorno-
Karabagh conflict.
Not until after the events of September 11, 2001, when
Azerbaijan allowed the United States to use its airspace and
facilities to make strikes against Afghanistan, did a U.S.
President (President George W. Bush), use the waiver provision
of the FREEDOM Support Act 3 72 to allow analogous aid to flow
to Azerbaijan.
b. Post-September 11 Registration of Nonimmigrant Aliens
The second development was even starker in its
demonstration of the influence of the Armenian Diaspora in the
United States. In December 2002, as part of the United States
efforts to reform its immigration laws in response to the events
of September 11, 2001, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft
issued a list of countries whose nationals, if present in the
United States, were required to register with the Department of
Justice.373 The list included Armenia, Pakistan, and Saudi
371. See Freedom Support Act of 1992 § 907.
372. See id. (providing for a waiver of its terms as determined by the President of
the United States); see also Aynura Ahmedova, Azerbaijan: Freeing the Freedom Support
Act, EURASIANET.ORG, Feb. 2, 2002, http:/www.eurasianet.orgldepartmentslinsight/
articles/pp020702.shtml (noting that restrictions imposed on assistance to Azerbaijan
under Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act of 1992 were temporarily lifted in
February of 2002).
373. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AG ORDER NO. 2636-2002, REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN
NONIMMIGRANT ALIENS FROM DESIGNATED COUNTRIES, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,136, 77,136
(2002) [hereinafter December 16 Registration List]. The December 16, 2002 list was the
third issued by the Department of Justice naming countries whose nationals in the
United States were required to register their presence with the Department of Justice,
and was issued pursuant to a policy first announced on August 12, 2002. See id.; DEP'T
OF JUSTICE AG, REGISTRATION AND MONITORING OF CERTAIN NONIMMIGRANTS, ORDER
No. 2608-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 52,584, 52,584 (2002). Those countries included Yemen,
Morocco, Eritrea, Algeria, and Afghanistan, among other countries. Kathleen Cahill,
Who's On, Who's Off, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2002, at B5 (discussing adjustments to the
list of countries who must register, including the addition and subsequent removal of
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Arabia. 374 The reaction of Armenians at home and of ethnic
Armenians in the United States was swift, immediate, and
effective. The list was issued on Monday, December 16, 2002. 3 75
By Wednesday, December 18, 2002, Armenia had been removed
from the list.376 Facing official protest from Armenia and
members of the Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues, as
well as an avalanche of faxes to the White House from Armenian
Americans, the administration backed down and removed
Armenia from the list. 377
The depth of support for the Republic within the Diaspora is
exemplified by billionaire Kirk Kerkorian. Kerkorian, a friend
and supporter of President Kocharian, has, since approximately
2001, through the mechanism of the Lincey Foundation, poured
an estimated $180 million (USD) of his personal fortune into
Armenia's roads and other infrastructure. 378
The nationalism and power of the Diaspora do not create
preconditions for reform; rather, they may play the role of a
joker in the pack that undermines the transition to democracy
and the rule of law. By ensuring blind and powerful support for
Armenia's interests, no matter the merits of the particular
circumstances, the Diaspora may facilitate the theatrical non-
reform reform that has characterized Armenia since its
Armenia). With the exception of Armenia and North Korea, the countries listed were
Muslim countries. Teresa Watanabe & Jennifer Meria, INS Order Prompts Big Lines,
Anger, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at B1.
374. See December 16 Registration List, supra note 373, at 77,136.
375. Id.
376. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AG Order No. 2638-2002, REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN
NONIMMIGRANT ALIENS FROM DESIGNATED COUNTRIES, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,642, 77,642
(2002) ('This Notice also rescinds an earlier Notice, Attorney General Order No. 263-002
of December 12, 2002, which appeared in the Federal Register on December 16, 2002 (67
FR 77136), and incorrectly listed Armenia as a designated country.").
377. E.g., Karen Branch-Brisco, U.S. Exempts Armenians from Registration Rule,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 18, 2002, at A6; John M. Broder, U.S. Drops Armenian
Men from List of Visitors Who Must Register, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at A22; Alan
Cooperman, Armenians in U.S. Not on INS List, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2002, at A4
(describing "furious round of lobbying").
378. See Armen Zakarian, Kerkorian Handed Armenia's Top State Honor,
ARMENIALIBERTY.ORG, May 20, 2005, http://www.armenialiberty.org/armeniareport/
report/en2005/05/AB551BCD-E9AC-4259-91B7-6D63E1A8DC60.asp.
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independence from the Soviet Union. Blind support does not
encourage true reform; rather, it promotes the utilization of
smoke and mirror mechanisms to create a simulacrum of reform.
In addition, donor countries have been too slow to recognize
the existence and implications of nationalism for the transition
of the former Soviet countries. Shlomo Avineri, in On Problems
of Transition in Postcommunist Societies, attributed the West's
blindness to the existence and ramifications of nationalism in
former Soviet republics to "the way anticommunist movements
of dissent in Central and Eastern European countries were
almost exclusively understood in the West in liberal, democratic,
and anti-totalitarian terms, overlooking a strong nationalist
ingredient that gave many of these movements so much of their
mobilizing power in their respective societies." 379 He further
warned "[w]hile Western attention is focused on the
developments towards democracy and the free market, a serious
realization of the power of nationalism in these societies is key
to understanding their present development and the possible
trends of their future course. '380
The role of the Diaspora in post-Soviet Armenia has been a
central one. It is, in large part, the ardent support for the
Armenian cause among the Diaspora that has enabled the
Republic to survive the many vicissitudes of the post-Soviet
experience. That support has included political 381  and
economic382 investment enabling Armenia to retain control of
the Azeri lands conquered during the Nagorno-Karabagh
dispute by, for example, funding the construction of the road
that connects Karabagh to Armenia through the Lachin
Corridor.383
379. See Avineri, supra note 7, at 1926.
380. Id. at 1936.
381. See discussion supra note 373 (describing the effectiveness of the Diaspora
lobby in getting Armenia removed from the INS special registration list).
382. See, e.g., Naush Boghossian, Investors Shore Up Country, DAILY NEWS OF L.A.
(Glendale/Burbank), June 20, 2004, at N3 (mention of the Diaspora's involvement in
renovating roads, airports, and housing developments in Armenia); LIBARIDIAN, supra
note 29, at 259 ("In absolute terms, remittances to families and social assistance from
the Diaspora constitute the largest infusion into the Armenian economy, making possible
for a large segment of population to achieve minimal survival.").
383. Armenian Assembly of America, Lachin Corridor Completed as Karabagh
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As we seek to identify the joker in the pack, however, the
question lingers whether the physical survival (even expansion)
of the Republic has come at the cost of the stimulation of
democratic and rule of law reform. Unquestioning support of the
status quo and protection of that status quo's interests abroad
may, counter-intuitively, serve to stifle the very goal sought by
the Diaspora-the flourishing of Armenia. The issue becomes
even more immediate in light of the provisions of the 2005
constitutional amendment that grants citizenship and voting
rights to members of the Armenian Diaspora. Their votes, cast
from afar, may be based on a smoke-and-mirror-engendered
illusion of rule of law and democratic reform.
2. Donor Country Motives
Looking further a field, there lurks another potential joker
in the pack: the multilayered motives of donor countries whose
ability to formulate clear policy is fractured by reluctance to
apply too much pressure on fragile regimes in unstable
neighborhoods. Donor countries such as the United States urge
and fund reform efforts in transitional countries. However,
donors are reluctant to take concrete action when their reform
efforts are undermined and fail to flower. Instead, recalcitrant
reformers and backsliders are often "given a pass." For example,
Thomas Carothers, in Aiding Democracy Abroad noted:
In 1998, for example, strongmen leaders in Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Cambodia manipulated electoral
processes yet were let off fairly lightly by at least some
of the international observers. The Council of Europe,
for example, found only minor problems with the first
round of the Armenian national elections of spring
1998, elections that were later heavily criticized by the
OSCE.
3 84
Marks 7th Year of Independence, ARMENIA THIS WEEK, Sept. 4, 1998, http://www.aaainc.
org/ArTW/article.php?articlelD=975 (describing Diaspora funding of the road through
the All-Armenia Hayastan Fund); KAPLAN, supra note 68, at 325 (2000) ("Armenia's
presence was established by a new road financed by [D]iaspora Armenians .... The road
cost $10.1 million, raised in telethons held in Los Angeles in 1996 and 1997 by
Armenian-Americans .... ").
384. CAROTHERS, supra note 26, at 132. Carothers also notes that:
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In addition, donors are more disposed to a slow pace of
reform-"evolution before revolution." William P. Alford
suggests "U.S. governmental programs embrace a 'technocratic,
gradualistic conception of democratization' that assumes a well-
modulated sequencing.... Essentially, this model presumes
that an authoritarian regime... will open to the possibility of
reform as its legitimacy fades and its populace presses for
greater freedoms. '385 The international community's preference
for a slow pace of reform, and aversion to sudden disruptive
transformation may play the role of the joker in the pack,
stifling revolutionary transformation that might more effectively
lead to democratic reform.
The deeper motives of the donors also have an impact. Donor
countries avow a desire to spread democracy and the benefits of
capitalism to transitional and developing countries. 386 However,
actual policy adopted by donors reveals ambivalence regarding
whether donors truly support democracy, and the self-
determination of people and countries, or an illusory democracy
where the power of the people is trammeled. 387
[I]f a leader is determined to undermine or compromise an election to stay in
power, aid can do little to stop it. Technical undertakings to strengthen
election administration can be nullified by a regime's decision to manipulate
the process. Observers may be able to document the ways in which an
electoral process is deformed by the ruling powers but often such publicity
does not stop strongmen from doing so - largely because the United States
and other countries have rarely exacted much punishment, economic,
diplomatic, or otherwise, for electoral wrongdoing.
Id. at 130.
385. William P. Alford, Exporting The Pursuit of Happiness", 113 Harv. L. Rev.
1677, 1685 (2003).
386. Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, Pax Democratica: The Gospel According to St.
Democracy (Columbia Int'l Affairs Online, Working Paper, 2000), http://www.ciaonet.
org/isa/hou0l/ (subscription required).
387. See Fareed Zakaria, The Limits of Democracy, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2007, at
35; Bruce Ledevitz, The Promise of Democracy, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 407, 421-422 (2003)
(reviewing Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and
Abroad).
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Multilayered donor motives also include a desire to access
the resources of transitional countries, such as the oil and gas
reserves of Azerbaijan. 388 One might hypothesize that the
United States will never push either a resistant Azerbaijan or
unwilling Armenia too far if such pressure would limit U.S.
industries' access to Azerbaijan's resources. One might also
theorize that the United States will push both countries only so
far as to ensure that its access to those resources continues to be
protected.
Thomas Carothers describes the effects of donor partiality
on the implementation of democracy in developing and
transitional countries: "The U.S. government finances observers
for some transitional elections because it wants to convince the
policy community that a favored government is successfully
democratizing. '389 One implication of Carothers's analysis is
that the United States, as a donor, may facilitate acceptance of
theatrical non-reform reform for its own underlying motives.
The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline was completed in 2005, winding
circuitously through the Republic of Georgia on its way to the
Black Sea and Western markets, instead of following the more
direct route through Armenia. 390 The question of the most
pressing motivation of Western donors-democratic transition in
Armenia and Azerbaijan; final settlement of the Nagorno-
Karabagh conflict; or maintenance of the rather superficial
stalemate in the region to ensure continued Western access the
energy reserves in the Caspian Sea-is still open to debate.
One may doubt, of course, whether increased pressure by its
Western donors would effectuate a greater and more substantive
change in Armenia. The alternate viewpoint is that such
pressure would send Armenia headlong into the arms of Russia,
388. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, There's Democracy, and There's an Oil Pipeline,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, A3 (describing conflict between the "clarion call for
democracy" and the reality on the ground in Central Asia and the Caucasus).
389. See CAROTHERS, supra note 26, at 132 (describing the funding of election
observations missions by interested donor countries, with the intent of extending an
imprimatur of legitimacy to favored leaders and governments).
390. See LIBARIDIAN, supra note 29, at 289.
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a Russia already giving ample lessons to the former Soviet
Republics of how to conduct theatrical non-reform reform. 391
3. Mirroring the West
Other potential suspects for the role of the joker in the pack
strike closer to home. The multilayered motives of donors were
discussed above. Might the example of donors be another
potential joker in the pack? Brian Tamanaha notes that:
It is an odd paradox that the unparalleled current
popularity of the rule of law coincides with widespread
agreement among theorists that it has degenerated in
the West. Theorists on both ends of the political
spectrum, right and left, have concurred on this
diagnosis, though the former have lamented this
decline while the latter have celebrated it.392
Another scholar has declared "[a]t home, the expansive and
increasing uses of the rule of law are becoming a threat to
democracy, freedom, and equality. ' 393 As the Western countries
encourage transitional states to mirror the West's idealization of
its own attributes, the transitional countries instead mirror and
imitate the unpleasant realities of some Western democracies.
For example, in the post-September 11 world, the attributes
of democracy in the United States appear to be shrinking under
the onslaught of a monarchical model of the presidency. As the
Bush administration advocates the wide-ranging power of the
presidency, administration officials have defended the right to
torture prisoners,394 to subject Americans in the United States
391. See ANDREW WILSON, VIRTUAL POLITICS 33-48 (2005) (describing the illusion
of democracy manufactured in Russia (where all politics appear to be virtual) and
pointing to the difficulty of distinguishing between the real and the faux in a country
where elections, political parties, and even political candidates may be hired for the
roles).
392. TAMANAHA, supra note 213, at 60.
393. David Kairys, Searching for the Rule of Law, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 307, 318
(2003).
394. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto Gonzalez, Counsel to the President
46, (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.tomjoad.orglbybeememo.htm (concluding that
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to wiretapping and other surveillance without issuance of a
warrant, 395 and to indefinitely hold American citizens in
detention without trial or contact with the outside world.3 96
Challenges to these policies brought to U.S. courts have
garnered mixed results, 397 and the U.S. populace has not risen
up in anger to defend the threat to democracy and the rule of
law.
The foregoing developments cast doubt upon the strength
and nature of the rule of law in the United States and whether it
can export "democracy" to transitional countries. The impact of
the inherent contradictions between the United States' stated
desire to spread democracy and its geostrategic interests
prioritizing regional security and stability398 -that someone or
some group be in control and available for negotiation-may
instead serve to undermine democratic reform. Added to these
doubts is the example the United States has set in its own
recent national election experiences-not only the debacle of the
2000 presidential election, but also the deeper anti-democratic
electoral structures 399 that led to those events.
"torture as defined in and proscribed by [the relevant U.S. statute], covers only extreme
acts.... [And where] the pain is physical, it must be of an intensity akin to that which
accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ failure.").
395. See, e.g., Jonathan Schell, The Hidden State Steps Forward, THE NATION,
Jan. 9, 2006, http://www.thenation.com/doc/2006019/schell.
396. See, e.g., Joseph Margulies, Dodging Justice, 28 LEGAL TIMES 50, Dec. 12,
2005 (discussing the Bush administration indictment of Jose Padilla after his
designation as an "enemy combatant" and imprisonment without charge for three years).
397. Compare Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that due
process requires a U.S. citizen designated as an enemy combatant be given reasonable
opportunity to contest his detention) with Padila v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649, 1650 (2006)
(rejecting as moot U.S. citizen Jose Padilla's challenge of his indefinite and unindicted
detention by the U.S. military based on his unexpected indictment in civilian court after
three years of confinement). But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006)
(holding military tribunals proposal to try individuals detained at Guantanamo violated
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions).
398. See CAROTHERS, supra note 26, at 5.
399. See Editorial, Drop Out of the College, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006, at A26
(expressing dissatisfaction with the antidemocratic effects of the United States' electoral
college institution and support for a proposed end run of its constraints by state
legislatures that would not require a constitutional amendment).
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The causes of Armenia's halting progress toward democratic
reform and adherence to the rule of law are complex and
intertwined. While none of the potential suspects for the role of
joker in the pack would appear to be sufficient, standing alone,
to halt democratic reform, these phenomena, interests and
policies appear to have, in combination, perverted the course of
democratic and rule of law reform in the Republic.
VII. CONCLUSION
Genuine democratic and rule of law reform will take place in
Armenia only in the context of structural legal changes that
ensure true separation of powers and the "free, equal and secret
expression" of the will of the Armenian people. 40 0 However, to
date, the process of transition in Armenia can be likened to a
vast hall of mirrors in which reality and illusion are inextricably
entangled, and reality is nearly impossible to discern.
While mirrors typically reflect the truth-an image of
reality-sometimes a mirror is used for other purposes. For
example, anthropologist Victor Turner has described "magical
mirrors of social reality [that] ... exaggerate, invert, re-form,
magnify, minimize, discolor, re-color, even deliberately
falsify .... ,401 Some uses of mirrors in Armenia include:
Illusions: it is in the nature of a magic mirror, such as that
of the Mirror of Erised, 40 2 or the funny mirrors at a carnival
show to create images that do not exist. Such may be the mirror
through which the West perceives its own self-conceived image
of idealized democratic perfection-a perfection that may, in
reality, be merely an aspiration.40 3
400. See Franck, Democratic Entitlement, supra note 19, at 5. The statement in the
text remains true, even in light of recognition that change in the legal framework, on its
own, cannot affect such reform.
401. See TURNER, supra note 1, at 42.
402. See J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE 213 (1997)
(explaining how individuals who look into the Mirror of Erised see their heart's desire).
403. Inherent in this image is a hierarchical conception of political evolution, with
Western capitalist democracies as the evolved entities toward which the transitional
countries must aspire. See, e.g., Ruth E. Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing
Development, 22 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 76-77 (2004) (addressing development in general, the
authors note: "Development is rooted in an evolutionary myth that reduces history to a
series of formal stages .... Western industrialized nations are at the pinnacle of this
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Expectation of Flattering Imitation: The West looks at
transitional countries and expects they will transform into
entities that mirror the West's idealized conception of itself.
Employing the Magician's Tools: Transitional countries may
adopt reforms that will create an image of the West, for the
West. Members of the governing elite educated in the West, or
through trainings in democracy and the rule of law funded by
Western taxpayers, are familiar with the images the West
yearns for and expects to see. They hold up theatrical "non-
reform" reforms-new legislation, new constitutions that uphold
Western norms, ratifications of international treaties-as
evidence that their countries have come to mirror the
fundamental legal and political norms espoused by the West.
A reform effort that does not succeed in looking through the
smoke and mirrors and identifying the potential jokers in the
pack-the various elements that contribute to Armenia's
faltering transition-is doomed to perpetuate a formalistic
superficial reform. For example, reform of the Constitution to
provide for the separation of powers was achieved in 2005 via
the plebiscite discussed in Part V.C. However, the nature of the
campaign to amend the Armenian Constitution of 1995, the lack
of opposition and popular input, and inadequate information to
the electorate arouses grave suspicions tjat these amendments,
too, were mere smoke and mirrors.
Mechanisms deployed to address the jokers in the pack will
determine the future of democracy and the rule of law in the
Republic. Now that the straightjacket of Executive overview of
the Judiciary has been formally removed, whether the Judiciary
will assume an independent role as guardian of the rule of law
in Armenia will become clear as the post-amendment
jurisprudence of the courts develop. However, as Professor
Frank Emmert noted: "[J]udges... have to learn to apply the
letter and the spirit of their new and democratic laws and to be
truly independent in their decisions. '40 4 He advises that
edifice[,] and the nations of the Third World are necessarily subordinate to those at the
apex."); see also discussion supra Part VI.B.3.
404. Emmert, supra note 187, at 301.
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"functioning control mechanisms must be established via checks
and balances, that is, a true division of power between the
Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary, and a better
comprehension of the specific tasks of each branch of the divided
state authority.''40 5 Professor Emmert further cautions that "[i]t
is easy to see that the adoption of Western-style legislation and
the organization of training seminars for judges and
administrators about these new laws alone are not going to be
enough to achieve a fundamental administrative and court
reform, or a real change in legal culture. ' 40 6 In that regard,
changes in the nature of Armenia's legal education system may
provide avenues for reform. These changes include, for example,
the introduction of clinical legal education and a greater
emphasis on international and comparative law.
The reality of endemic corruption is unlikely to be cured by
constitutional reform alone. The pervasive corruption within the
Judiciary and other areas of Armenian public life also must be
targeted. However, it is difficult to devise a strategy that does
not amount to mere smoke and mirrors, where the levers of
power are almost certainly controlled by corrupt clientelist
networks. However, as the current crop of Soviet-era judges and
other public officials are replaced by individuals whose
professional training and experience post-date Armenian
independence, corruption in the Judiciary may decline. While
that possibility may be undermined where participation in a
corrupt system is necessary for accession to, and maintenance
of, such offices, and newcomers may be subverted by the existing
clientelist networks, the opportunities for incremental change
may nonetheless exist. True rule of law reform will be possible
with commitment by the governing and professional elites, as
well as genuine grass roots engagement and popular power to
participate in governance.
There is little hope for the advancement of democratic and
rule of law reform while the Republic remains in a state of
armed readiness because of the unresolved Nagorno-Karabagh
405. Id.
406. Id. at 302.
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conflict. Coincidentally, the two other South Caucasian
republics, Georgia and Azerbaijan, also held elections in quick
succession in 2003.407 Via the Rose Revolution of 2003-2004, the
Georgian people rejected the results of presidential elections
that were widely perceived and condemned as unfree and
unfair,408 and successfully demanded the readministration of
those elections. In contrast, in Azerbaijan, dying strongman and
autocrat, Heydar Aliev, handed over the Presidency to his son
through the mechanism of a stagemanaged and fraudulent
presidential election. 40 9 Locked in a hostile stalemate, neither
Armenia's nor Azerbaijan's military may be able to afford to
allow a flowering of democratic expression that might threaten
the existing status quo.
407. See OSCE/ODIHR, GEORGIA, EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN
GEORGIA, 4 JANUARY 2004, OSCE/ODIHR ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION REPORT 1
(Feb. 28, 2004), http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/02/2183-en.pdf [hereinafter
GEORGIA ELECTION REPORT] (discussing the presidential election in Georgia); Farhad
Husseinov, Eurasia: A Caspian Revolution, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2005, at A9
(referencing the disputed 2003 presidential election in Azerbaijan two years earlier).
408. See GEORGIA ELECTION REPORT, supra note 407, at 1, 3-4.
In contrast to the 2 November 2003 parliamentary elections that were
characterized by systematic and widespread fraud, the authorities generally
displayed the collective political will to conduct a more democratic election
process.... The 4 January 2004 extraordinary presidential election....was
widely viewed as a test for the newly installed authorities to demonstrate
their level of commitment to the democratic election process. In the minds of
many, the election also served as a popular referendum on the events of 22-
23 November, also known as the "Rose Revolution ..
Id.
409. See Husseinov, supra note 407; Hugh Pope, Pro- West Leaders In Georgia Push
Shevardnadze Out, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2003. Widespread public protests were
violently repressed by the police and military. Id. Parliamentary elections held in
Azerbaijan in 2005, were condemned by international observers and local opposition
leaders. C.J. Chivers, Monitors Report Fraud in Azerbaijan Parliamentary Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005, at A3. Public protests were met with a repetition of the violent
repression of 2004. C.J. Chivers, Police Break Up Peaceful Demonstration in Azerbaijan,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at A16. In contrast, Georgia's military did not intervene to
quell the pro-democracy expressions of the Rose Revolution. Seth Mydans, Foes of
Georgian Leader Storm Into Parliament Building, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at A14
('Troops and the police, mostly armed with truncheons, blocked roads around
Parliament and the nearby presidential offices but made no effort to prevent the
storming of the building.")
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The contrast suggests that the ultimate resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabagh conflict is a necessary pre-condition for real
democratic and rule of law reform in the Republic. However, it is
a resolution unlikely to come about as long as Armenia believes
that its consolidation of control on the ground in Karabagh will
strengthen its claim to the territory, and so long as the active
support of the Diaspora creates disincentives for compromise.
The helpless acquiescence of Western policy on the issue leaves
little room for encouragement of a ready resolution.
Further complicating the prospects of resolution are the
inherent contradictions in Western policy to Armenia and the
Transcaucasus--on one hand urging and providing financial
support for democracy and rule of law reform, and on the other,
offering almost unqualified support to the incumbent
administration so as to prevent the eruption of further
hostilities in the region.
However, the joker in the pack is the trump card, the one
card that may win the game. The Armenian Diaspora, earlier
identified as a potential joker, may play the role of just such a
trump card. In Diaspora Bonds, Professor Anupam Chander
describes in the context of his Diaspora model paradigm, a
positive role for Diasporas in their countries of origin: "[t]he
model locates in [D]iasporas the possibility of building bridges
across the world, between rich and poor countries and between
liberal and illiberal societies. Diasporas offer the possibility of
uniting the world through a web of personal and community
loyalties .... ,4 10 The influence exercised by the Armenian
Diaspora, both within Armenia as well as with respect to issues
concerning Armenia in their various host countries, opens the
possibility that active, educated, and farseeing intervention by
the Diaspora may act as a stimulus and guide for fundamental
transformation of the Republic's democratic traditions and its
adherence to the rule of law. In order to fulfill the role, the
Diaspora may have to choose between the kneejerk defense of
Armenia, and well-thought-out strategies that apply pressure to
the appropriate levers of power.
410. Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1050 (2001).
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The positive role of the Armenian Diaspora may already be
reflected in the use of smoke and mirror mechanisms, described
earlier in this Article, to obfuscate the reality of non-
transformative reform. While the regime in Azerbaijan, for
example, may be free to demonstrate wanton disregard for
international electoral standards,411 Armenia's continued need
for the support of its Diaspora may serve to constrain the ability
to utilize similar tactics if the ameliorative smoke and mirrors
devices are not also employed. The 2005 Constitution's avenue
for Diaspora citizenship opens a path for greater Diaspora voice
in the Republic.
Analysis of Armenia's post-Soviet experiences is replete with
lessons and implications for Western countries that seek to
spread democracy and the rule of law abroad. First is an
appreciation of the dangers of lack of informed and long-term
planning and of hubristic intervention and expectations. Facts
on the ground, allegiances, power balances, and culture maybe
all too difficult for the outsider to discern. Even the well-
intentioned activity of an outsider attempting to foster
democracy and the rule of law may tip the balance or change
events in unintended and destructive ways. Second, lack of
clarity, internal contradictions in, or delusions about its foreign
affairs objectives on the part of a donor country can and will be
exploited by the local individuals, entities, and groups that
prioritize acquisition or retention of their own power over the
wellbeing of their compatriots. Third, the admittedly-flawed but
cherished democratic traditions of the West did not come
easily, 412 and more than 15 years of experience with the former
Soviet republics makes clear that democracy cannot be imported
wholesale into countries with different political traditions. Those
who desire to foster transitions must empower the people as a
whole, not only targeted categories of actors, such as judges and
government officials. In the final analysis, democracy is about
the polity. It is the people who can, will, and must determine the
path of their future. Finally, even a superficial reading of
411. See, e.g., supra note 100 and accompanying text (contrasting the styles of
Armenia and Azerbaijan).
412. Think, for example, of the compromises (including slavery and the slave trade)
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution signed by the Founders.
20071
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American history reveals democratic traditions have come at a
high cost, with periods of darkness followed by fundamental
amendments to the Constitution-leading to the regulation and
protection of the rights and freedoms so vaunted today.
Transition in Armenia, as well as in other transitional countries,
will be strengthened by similar organic domestic developments.
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VIII. APPENDIX413
413. University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castafieda Library, Map Collection,
Caucasus and Central Asia, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/caucasus-
cntrl asia-pol_00.jpg (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
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